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Abstract
The EU’s lagging economic growth and global competitiveness require the pro-
motion of technological innovation, the key determinant of long term economic
growth. On the other hand, increasing disparities among EU member states
require the promotion of convergence as they may threaten the EU’s economic
feasibility and political viability. Cohesion policy has adopted the dual role
for the promotion of EU global competitiveness and EU economic cohesion;
concepts incompatible by nature. The objectives of Europe 2020, specifically
the promotion of technological innovation through investment in R&D, are as-
sessed in terms of their compatibility with the objectives of Cohesion policy,
specifically the reduction of disparities within the EU. An analysis of conver-
gence in the EU determines that both beta convergence and sigma convergence
are taking place, although large disparities in GDP per capita persist. An em-
pirical analysis of the relative effects on GDP per capita of investment in R&D
and investment in human capital determines that investment in human capital
plays a significant role. Thus, key policy focus areas that meet the objectives
of both Europe 2020 and Cohesion policy include investment in human capital
as well as purposive diffusion of technology within the EU and the distribution
of the benefits, economic and otherwise, of technological innovation enabled by
the Single Market.
JEL Classification R12, F15, O31





Zpomalený ekonomický r̊ust a nároky na globálńı konkurenceschopnost si v
př́ıpadě EU vyžaduj́ı uplatněńı technologických inovaćı jako dlouhodobě kĺıčové
determinanty ekonomického rozvoje. Na druhé straně si však vzr̊ustaj́ıćı dispar-
ity mezi členskými zeměmi EU vyžaduj́ı prosazeńı konvergenčńıho př́ıstupu, aby
neohrozily možnost uskutečn̆ovat a politicky prosazovat ekonomickou koncepci
EU. Kohezńı politika hraje dvojjedinou roli na jedné straně podpory globálńı
konkurenceschopnosti EU a na druhé straně podpory solidarity, což jsou ze
své podstaty neslučitelné koncepty. Záměry strategie, ztělesněné v programu
Evropa 2020, zejména pak podpora technologických inovaćı prostřednictv́ım
investic do vědy a výzkumu, jsou vyhodnocovány s ohledem na jejich kompat-
ibilitu s ćıli kohezni politiky, tj. zejména snahou omezit disparity uvnitř EU.
Analýza situace v EU ukazuje, že tu prob́ıhaj́ı beta i sigma modely konver-
gence, ačkoliv přetrvávaj́ı velké rozd́ıly v HDP na hlavu. Empirická analýza
relativńıch efekt̊u investic do vědy a výzkumu a investic do lidského kapitálu na
HDP per capita ukazuje, že druhý typ investic hraje významnou roli. Z toho
plyne, že kĺıčové soustředěńı na oblasti, odpov́ıdaj́ıćı ćıl̊um strategie Evropa
2020 a kohezńı politiky zahrnuj́ı investice do lidského kapitálu stejně tak jako
śčelovou dif́szi technologíı uvnitř EU a distribuci jej́ıch efekt̊u, ekonomických a
také technologických tak, jak to umožn̆uje jednotný trh unie.
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Kĺıčová slova ekonomická integrace, konvergence, ino-
vace, ekonomický r̊ust
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Chapter 1
Introduction
I t has long been recognised that technological innovation is the engine of long
term economic growth.
EU economic integration seeks to increase long term economic growth of the
EU and each of its member states through increasing the Single Market and the
competitiveness thereof and therein, as well as increasing the EU’s capacity for
technological innovation, the key determinant of long term economic growth.
In response to the EU’s present low economic growth and lagging global
competitiveness in terms of innovation and technology, the EU presented Eu-
rope 2020: a ten year economic growth strategy with the objective of increasing
the EU’s global competitiveness and promoting a dynamic economy based on
knowledge and innovation.
On the other hand, EU economic integration inevitably results in tendencies
for the concentration of economic activity in economies that are already highly
developed and competitive. The heterogeneity of member states in terms of
development and competitiveness serves only to exacerbate the uneven dis-
tribution of economic activity within the EU and disparities among member
states in terms of economic growth and competitiveness.
In the case that member states are not competitive enough to participate
competitively in the Single Market and as a result experience low economic
growth, unemployment and fiscal imbalances, then surely the EU will lose
economic feasibility and political support.
Indeed, subsequent to the economic shocks of the recent global financial
crisis and EU sovereign debt crisis, significant and widening disparities among
member states emerged, most noticeably in terms of economic growth, unemployment—
particularly with respect to youth unemployment—and fiscal imbalances—
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particularly with respect to government debt. Such disparities have led to
economic and political instability across the EU, and to questions as to the
feasibility of the EU and the Single Market.
In recognition of such consequences of EU economic integration the Treaty
establishing the European Community has as one of its aims the promotion of
overall harmonious development and economic and social cohesion within the
EU, and in particular EU Cohesion policy aims to reduce disparities between
the levels of development of member states (EuropeanUnion (2006b)).
More recently, with the introduction of the Lisbon Agenda and thereafter
Europe 2020, Cohesion policy is identified as one of the key delivery mechanisms
of the Europe 2020 strategy which aims to promote the EU’s global competi-
tiveness and long term economic growth by inter alia promoting technological
innovation through investment in R&D (EuropeanCommission (2010b)).
Investment in R&D tends to favour concentration of R&D activity which
increases its efficiency and productivity. Furthermore R&D activity tends to
concentrate in economies which are already developed and competitive; thus
further increasing their competitiveness. Thus while investment in R&D is
crucial in promoting the EU’s global competitiveness and long term economic
growth, it is likely that, without intervention, it will further exacerbate dispar-
ities among member states in terms of competitiveness and economic growth.
Secondly, the relative importance of investment in R&D in competitiveness
and economic growth depends crucially on an economy’s stage of development;
investment in R&D is crucial for competitiveness and economic growth in ad-
vanced economies. Furthermore the various factors which affect competitive-
ness and economic growth, including investment in R&D, are interdependent
and mutually reinforcing on economic growth; therefore the effects of invest-
ment in R&D on competitiveness and economic growth in an economy which
is less than advanced may be limited by other economic factors.
Thirdly, investment in R&D is driven by the incentive to gain market power
and to earn profits. The allocation of Cohesion policy funds by the public sec-
tor will likely lack such incentive. Consequently investment in R&D may be
directed towards basic research by universities and public research institutes
over applied research by firms and industry which is less conducive to techno-
logical innovation, and especially more so if the link between universities and
public research institutes, and firms and industry is not strong. Furthermore
investment in R&D may be less efficient and productive in terms of technolog-
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ical innovation and economic growth if it is not driven by the incentive to gain
market power and to earn profits.
Thus while Cohesion policy is increasingly aligned with the objectives of
Europe 2020, it is questionable whether the objectives of Europe 2020 to pro-
mote investment in knowledge and innovation in regional development, based
on the premise that it will contribute to EU global competitiveness and long
term economic growth, are fully aligned with those of Cohesion policy.
T he objective of this thesis is to assess the role of Cohesion Policy as one
of the key delivery mechanisms of the Europe 2020 strategy; in particular, the
relative importance of investment in knowledge and innovation in promoting
the development and competitiveness of lagging member states and in reducing
the disparities among member states.
Firstly, this thesis aims to assess the objectives of Europe 2020 in terms of
Cohesion policy in the present context of both low EU economic growth and
lagging global competitiveness and significant disparities among member states
in terms of competitiveness and economic growth.
It has long been recognised that technological innovation is the engine of
long term economic growth. While lagging economies may not benefit directly
from investment in R&D, they can surely benefit from the diffusion within the
EU of the results of technological innovation, as well as from the economic
benefits derived from such technological innovation enabled by the Single Mar-
ket. After all, the Single Market, in which all member states participate, plays
a significant role in increasing the EU’s capacity for technological innovation.
Bearing in mind the need to promote the EU’s global competitiveness, it is
important to balance the incentives for technological innovation and the distri-
bution of the economic benefits derived from technological innovation which is
enabled by the Single Market.
Secondly, this thesis aims to assess whether convergence in the EU is taking
place and, in terms of Cohesion policy, whether the disparities among member
states is reducing.
Thirdly, this thesis aims to identify the key policy focus areas for Cohesion
policy, in relation to the objectives of Europe 2020, for the promotion of the
development and competitiveness of lagging member states and the reduction of
disparities in GDP per capita across member states, and which best satisfy the
objectives of both Cohesion policy and Europe 2020. The identification of such
key policy focus areas for Cohesion policy is in the context of the approach
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to the new programming period for 2014-2020 for which it is apparent that
Cohesion policy will continue to focus on the objectives of EU2020.
T he thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 discusses the objectives of
EU economic integration, and its consequences. Chapter 3 discusses Cohesion
policy and its role in increasing the competitiveness of lagging member states
as well as that of the EU globally, and in reducing disparities among member
states. Chapter 4 provides an overview of the literature relating to economic
growth and economic integration. Chapter 5 presents an analysis of conver-
gence of member states within the EU. Chapter 6 presents an empirical model
which aims to identify the key policy focus areas for Cohesion policy for the
promotion of the development and competitiveness of lagging member states
and the reduction of disparities in GDP per capita across member states, and
which best satisfy the objectives of both Cohesion policy and Europe 2020.
Chapter 7 summarises the findings and concludes.
Chapter 2
The Objective of Economic
Integration is an Increase in
Welfare
T he objective of economic integration is an increase in welfare. Welfare has
numerous interpretations but for our purposes let us assume that it is defined
by GDP per capita. Thus an increase in welfare refers to a high and rising
standard of living represented by a high level of GDP per capita and sustained
long term economic growth.
A high level of GDP per capita is reflected in the production capacity and
efficiency of an economy presently for a given set of factors of production,
technology, institutions and economic environment; let’s call this the economic
set. The production capacity of an economy is given by its stock of factors of
production—capital, both physical and human capital, and labour—and tech-
nology. The efficiency of an economy is determined by the productivity of these
factors of production within the context of the institutional and economic en-
vironment. This is the concept of static efficiency; the efficiency of an economy
in the short term deriving from the efficient allocation of resources.
Sustained long term economic growth, on the other hand, is reflected in the
potential of the production capacity and efficiency of an economy for a given
economic set; that is, in its capacity to sustain long term economic growth for a
given economic set. Scale economies and technological innovation continuously
increase the productivity of a given economic set (Balassa (1965)). This is the
concept of dynamic efficiency; the efficiency of an economy in the long term
deriving from increasing returns to scale and technological progress (Balassa
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(1965)).
Said in another way, with static efficiency an economy reaches its production-
possibility frontier, that is the maximum production possible with given re-
sources; whereas, with dynamic efficiency an economy is able to move beyond
its production-possibility frontier and to increase the maximum production
possible without increasing given resources (Balassa (1965)).
Let us pause here to distinguish between the concepts of innovation and
technology and technological innovation. Innovation and technology refers to
innovation arising out of market competition in terms of unique products and
production processes, and sophisticated methods of business organisation and
marketing. Such innovation and technology is enhanced through the clustering
of firms and industries which contributes to innovation and technology through
spillovers. Technological innovation, on the other hand, refers to the develop-
ment of new, high technology, advanced products and processes in economies
that are approaching the frontiers of knowledge; technological innovation in
such advanced economies is the only source of long term economic growth.
Scale economies and technological innovation, which increase dynamic ef-
ficiency, derive from the existence of a large market—specifically high levels
of consumption—and imperfect competition which together enable firms to in-
ternalise increasing returns to scale and to derive profits from investment in
R&D.
Firstly, a large market enables scale economies which enable ”production
maximisation” and ”trade optimisation” (Meade (1953)). Economies of scale
increase production efficiency through scale and specialisation and increase con-
sumption through increases in trade and the quantity and variety of consumer
goods available (Balassa (1965); Krugman (1979)). In addition, increased com-
petition in a large market continually induces innovation and technology in
products and production processes which further increase scale economies (Bal-
assa (1965)).
Secondly, a large market enables technological innovation as it presents
a greater opportunity for firms to earn profits from investment in R&D, the
key determinant of technological innovation. A large market reduces the un-
certainty and costs associated with investment in R&D. Such technological
innovation is likely to further increase the size of the market due to resulting
increases in the technology of products and the efficiency of production pro-
cesses. Furthermore, economies of scale in the R&D sector, enabled by a large
market, increase the efficiency and productivity of investment in R&D: Econ-
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omies of scale in the R&D sector reduce the fixed costs of investment in R&D
and increase the availability and stock of existing knowledge and technology
which facilitates further R&D (Balassa (1965); Rivera-Batiz & Romer (1991)).
Therefore, a large market and imperfect competition together enable scale
economies and technological innovation, and enable firms to internalise increas-
ing returns to scale and to derive profits from investment in R&D.
T he objective of EU economic integration is an increase in the static and
dynamic efficiency of the EU and its member states (Balassa (1965); Baldwin
(1989)). The removal of barriers to the free mobility of goods, services, labour
and capital and the expansion of the market has two objectives: firstly, to fos-
ter competition and secondly, to benefit from scale economies and technological
innovation. First, competition induced by the Single Market results in static
efficiency: a once-off efficient reallocation of resources which increases their pro-
ductivity, and which results in a once-off increase in real income. Second, scale
economies and technological innovation induced by the Single Market result in
dynamic efficiency: continuous increases in the productivity of resources which
result in increases in real income over the long term.
An increase in dynamic efficiency, however, comes at a cost. Scale econo-
mies and technological innovation, which increase dynamic efficiency, are asso-
ciated with imperfect competition which reduces welfare resulting from static
efficiency (Balassa (1965)). Furthermore, scale economies and technological in-
novation tend to result in the concentration of economic activity and therefore
an uneven distribution of economic activity, and by implication real income,
within the EU.
In the context of increased competition in an increased market firms seek
to increase their competitiveness by exploiting economies of scale in order to
remain in the market and to earn profits; firms that are less competitive are
forced to exit the market. As a result, oligopolistic market structures emerge,
comprising fewer, larger, more competitive firms, and economic activity, and by
implication real income, becomes concentrated within industries and countries,
as well as within the EU. Economic activity tends to concentrate in highly
industrialised or developed economies, thus economies that are initially com-
petitive tend to become even more so (Balassa (1965); Krugman (1979; 1991)).
In the case that an economy is not competitive enough to participate in the in-
creased market, such changes in market structure may lead to a significant loss
of industry accompanied by significant unemployment, low economic growth
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and fiscal imbalances resulting partly from increased social spending. Thus on
a national level, such consequences of EU economic integration make sense only
if firstly, the resources that are freed up as a result of economic integration are
re-employed productively elsewhere in the economy and secondly, the economy
benefits from long term economic growth derived elsewhere in the economy as
a result of EU economic integration.
In the context of increased competition in an increased market firms seek to
increase their competitiveness through technological innovation in order to re-
main in the market and to earn profits. In addition an increased market enables
investment in R&D as it reduces the uncertainty and costs associated with such
investment. R&D activity tends to concentrate in highly competitive econo-
mies in which the institutional and economic environments are conducive to
R&D, thus economies that are initially competitive tend to become even more
so. Furthermore R&D activity tends to favour concentration as it increases the
efficiency and productivity of R&D by reducing the fixed costs of investment
in R&D and by increasing the availability and stock of existing knowledge and
technology which facilitates further R&D (Rivera-Batiz & Romer (1991)).
Thus EU economic integration and the Single Market, while increasing dy-
namic efficiency of the EU through scale economies and technological innova-
tion, inevitably result in an uneven distribution of economic activity, and by
implication real income, within the EU whereby economic activity tends to con-
centrate in those economies that are initially competitive. As a result initially
competitive economies are able to take advantage of and benefit from scale econ-
omies and technological innovation which result from EU economic integration
and the Single Market in which all member states participate. Consequently,
the competitiveness of initially competitive economies and their attractiveness
for capital and labour is further increased (Balassa (1965); Krugman (1979;
1991)). The heterogeneity of member states in terms of competitiveness serves
only to exacerbate the uneven distribution of economic activity, and by im-
plication real income within the EU; member states that are less competitive
are less likely to be able to participate competitively in the Single Market and
to derive economic benefits from scale economies and technological innovation
which result from EU economic integration and the Single Market in which all
member states participate. In the absence of intervention, such uneven distri-
bution of economic activity, once established, tends to persist and may result
in low economic growth, unemployment, fiscal imbalances, and economic and
political instability in member states that are less competitive. Therefore it
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is essential that the economic benefits of EU economic integration, in terms
of economic activity and employment, are equitably distributed among mem-
ber states since all member states constitute the Single Market which enables
increased competition and an increased capacity for scale economies and tech-
nological innovation in the EU. Policies for EU global competitiveness and long
term economic growth are essential for a high level of GDP per capita and sus-
tained long term economic growth in the EU; however it is essential that such
policies are accompanied by policies for the equitable distribution of the eco-
nomic benefits deriving from the Single Market and EU global competitiveness
if the EU is to maintain economic feasibility and political support.
T he objective of economic integration is an increase in welfare. The effect of
economic integration on welfare encompasses two aspects: an increase in real
income (efficiency) and the redistribution of real income among economies (eq-
uity). Both aspects of welfare should be considered in an analysis of economic
integration (Balassa (1965)).
Significant disparities in the distribution of real income among member
states are apparent and persistent as presented in Appendix A.
The disparities in the distribution of real income tend to run along the lines
of old EU15 and new EU12 member states, as well as along the lines of core and
periphery member states. Disparities exist in the distribution of real income
between the central and northern EU15 member states and the southern EU15
member states, Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal. A similar core-periphery
pattern is evident in EU12 although it is less pronounced than that in EU15.
Welfare in the EU can be increased through increases in real income result-
ing from long term economic growth in the EU and in each of its member states
(efficiency) and through the redistribution of real income among member states
(equity) in terms of the distribution of economic activity and employment, and
the diffusion of technology or the distribution of economic benefits deriving
from the Single Market.
Long term economic growth of member states requires that each member
state is able to participate competitively in and benefit from the Single Market.
The factors which are relevant to increasing the competitiveness of an econ-
omy depend crucially on its stage of development (WEF (2012b)): Economies
that are less developed have lower productivity and are able to compete based
on low prices which reflect low wages. At this stage of development competi-
tiveness is increased through the quality of institutions, infrastructure and the
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workforce, in terms of health and primary education, and a stable macroeco-
nomic environment. As productivity and wages increase, economies compete
based on the efficiency of production and product quality. At this stage of
development competitiveness is increased through higher education and train-
ing, efficient goods, labour and financial markets, the ability to use and adapt
existing technologies and a large market as these factors increase productiv-
ity. As economies exhaust production efficiencies, competitiveness is increased
through the use of the most sophisticated business practices and production
processes and an environment that is conducive to investment in R&D and
technological innovation. Such advanced economies compete based on innova-
tion in terms of unique products and processes and sophisticated methods of
business organisation and marketing. The clustering of firms and industries
increases efficiency and innovation and technology through increased oppor-
tunities for collaboration and spillovers. For economies that are approaching
the frontiers of knowledge, technological innovation in developing new, high
technology, advanced products and processes is the only source of long term
economic growth.
Although technological innovation may not be an economic factor that is
equally relevant to every member state’s stage of development, innovation and
technology and the results of technological innovation will surely increase long
term economic growth of every member state. To this end, the diffusion within
the EU of innovation and technology and the results of technological innovation
is significant in promoting long term economic growth. Crucially, such diffusion
requires high levels of human capital to promote the absorption of such inno-
vation and technology within the EU, and the creation of further innovation
and technology (Romer (1990); Rivera-Batiz & Romer (1991)).
Global competitiveness and long term economic growth of the EU requires
an increase in dynamic efficiency deriving from scale economies and technolog-
ical innovation. Crucially, investment in R&D, the key determinant of tech-
nological innovation and long term economic growth for the EU, should be
concentrated where it is most efficient and productive. However, this concen-
tration of R&D activity and the economic benefits deriving therefrom, while
increasing the dynamic efficiency of the EU, will likely exacerbate disparities in
real income among member states. Therefore, the economic benefits deriving
from such technological innovation which benefit the EU as a whole should be
distributed within the EU, through either purposive diffusion of technology, in
terms of the distribution of economic activity and employment based on the
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use of that technological innovation, for example through FDI, or through the
distribution of economic benefits derived from that technological innovation
through the EU budget in terms of Cohesion policy.
T he objective of EU economic integration is an increase in the competi-
tiveness of the EU globally and of each of its member states, resulting from
an increase in static and dynamic efficiency induced by the Single Market in
which all member states participate.
Chapter 3
Policy Tools for Competitiveness
and Convergence
T he EU operates as an economic entity in the global economy, yet at the
same time it consists of 27 member states which operate as individual national
economic entities in the global economy and within the EU. However, although
they are part of the EU economy, the EU member state economies are not
similar. As the EU increased in terms of member states it became increasingly
heterogenous in terms of the member state economies which it comprised. Thus
the EU has to walk two paths: on the one hand it has to continue to ensure the
competitiveness of the EU in the global economy and the prosperity derived
therefrom, and on the other hand it has to balance the growth and development
of its member states. Of importance is the reduction in disparities in terms
of economic prosperity between the member state economies. This is impor-
tant for two reasons. First, if large disparities among member states persist,
the EU will be perceived as unfair and will lose political support. Second, if
the EU results in costs to member states that do not outweigh the benefits
of EU membership, such as low economic growth, unemployment and fiscal
imbalances, the EU may lose economic feasibility and political support.
Two EU policies are applicable in this respect. Europe 2020 which is out-
ward looking, in other words a strategy for the EU in terms of its competitive
position in the global economy, and Cohesion policy which is inward looking, in
other words a policy for the EU in terms of its balanced economic growth and
development and social and economic convergence among its member states.
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E urope 2020 is the EU’s strategy for promoting the EU’s global competitive-
ness and long term economic growth by developing a dynamic and knowledge
based economy (EuropeanCommission (2010a)). Europe 2020 emphasises the
role of innovation and technology as the key driver of the EU’s global com-
petitiveness and long term economic growth (EuropeanCommission (2010a)).
Specifically, this ’smart growth’ strategy focuses on promoting investment in
innovation, knowledge and human capital. To this end Europe 2020 focuses on
a number of targets to be achieved by 2020, specifically:
1. to increase its investment in R&D to 3% of GDP1
2. to increase its employment rate to 75%2
3. to increase education attainment by increasing the tertiary education
attainment rate to 40% of the population3 and by reducing the early
school leaving rate to 10%4
C ohesion policy is the EU’s regional policy through which it aims to promote
regional competitiveness and employment and to reduce social, economic and
territorial disparities across regions (EuropeanUnion (2006c)). For the 2007-
2013 programming period Cohesion policy was the second largest item on the
EU budget, after Common Agricultural Policy, being allocated e347 billion,
equivalent to 35.7% of the total EU budget (EuropeanCommission (2013c)).5
1This target relates to input into rather than output of R&D and innovation. The Eu-
ropean Commission proposes to develop an indicator that reflects the intensity of R&D and
innovation (EuropeanCommission (2010a)).
2This target relates to employment of the population aged 20-64 and envisages an increase
in the employment rate from 69% (EuropeanCommission (2010a)).
3This target relates to the education attainment of the population aged 30-34 and envis-
ages an increase in the tertiary education attainment rate from 31% (EuropeanCommission
(2010a)).
4This target relates to early school leavers and envisages a decrease in the drop out rate
from 15% (EuropeanCommission (2010a)).
5The EU budget is relatively small, amounting to 1.12% of EU GNI (EuropeanCommission
(2013b))
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For the 2007-2013 programming period Cohesion policy has three objectives
receiving 81.5%, 16% and 2.5% of the Cohesion policy budget respectively6,
specifically:
1. Convergence
2. Competitiveness and Employment
3. European Territorial Co-operation
The convergence objective, which receives by far the largest portion of Co-
hesion policy funds, aims to reduce regional disparities.7 Regions whose GDP
per capita is below 75% of the average EU GDP per capita are eligible for
convergence objective funds. However, regions whose GDP per capita is above
this threshold only because the 2004 and 2007 EU accessions reduced the aver-
age EU GDP per capita are classified as ’phasing out’ regions and continue to
receive convergence objective funds until 2013.8 In addition to the allocation of
funds on this basis, member states, as opposed to regions, whose GNI per capita
is below 90% of the average EU GNI per capita are eligible to receive funds
from the Cohesion fund.9 The Cohesion fund was established with the 2004
accession in order to support the convergence objective; although eligible mem-
bers include old member states Greece, Portugal and Spain (EuropeanUnion
(2006a)).
The competitiveness and employment objective aims to create jobs by pro-
moting regional competitiveness in order to attract business and investment
(EuropeanUnion (2006c)).10 Regions are eligible for competitiveness and em-
ployment objective funds if they are not eligible for convergence objective funds.
In other words, competitiveness and employment objective funds are allocated
to richer regions in order to assist them in increasing their competitiveness
through inter alia innovation, and education and training programmes. Re-
gions who had previously been eligible to receive convergence objective funds
6For the 2007-2013 programming period Cohesion policy has a total budget of e347
billion. This budget is funded by the ERDF, ESF and the Cohesion fund, having budgets of
e201 billion, e55 billion and e70 billion respectively.
7For the 2007-2013 programming period the convergence objective has a budget of e283
billion which amounts to 81.5% of the total Cohesion policy budget
8The 2004 and 2007 EU accessions significantly increased the EU population
9For the 2007-2013 programming period the Cohesion fund has a budget of e70 billion
which amounts to just under 25% of the convergence objective budget.
10For the 2007-2013 programming period the competitiveness and employment objective
has a budget of e55 billion which amounts to 16% of the total Cohesion policy budget.
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are classified as ’phasing in’ regions and receive additional funding to as-
sist them in the competitiveness and employment objective (EuropeanUnion
(2006c)).
C ohesion policy for the 2007-2013 programming period shows an increased
alignment with the objectives of Europe 2020 (previously the Lisbon Agenda).
Cohesion policy shows a significant emphasis on using cohesion policy funds
for investment in knowledge and innovation, with more than e85 billion allo-
cated to such investments (EuropeanCommission (2007)). e49.5 billion of this
is allocated to investments aimed at the generation of innovation and new tech-
nology, such as investments that improve the capacity for innovation in firms
and investment in R&D (EuropeanCommission (2007)), where such investment
relies on the exploitation of existing ”poles of excellence” (EuropeanCommis-
sion (2007), p7) or the improvement of existing capacity. The remainder is
allocated to investments aimed at the diffusion and use of technology, specif-
ically ICT, and the creation of employment through skills development and a
more flexible and entrepreneurial business environment (EuropeanCommission
(2007)). Indeed the European Commission’s seventh progress report towards
the 2014-2020 Cohesion policy programming period proposes that Cohesion
policy investments should be selected on the basis of ”the biggest contribution
to smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” (EuropeanCommission (2011), p5)
and by taking into consideration the Europe 2020 targets (EuropeanCommis-
sion (2011)).
The use of Cohesion policy in the delivery of the objectives of Europe 2020
is enforced through ’earmarking’ provisions which influence the member states’
allocations of cohesion funds. ’Earmarking’ obliges EU15 member states and
encourages EU12 member states to allocate the majority of cohesion policy
funds to programmes that are aligned to Europe 2020 objectives such as inter
alia investment in R&D, innovation and human capital. For the 2007-2013
programming period, the earmarking targets for the convergence objective and
the competitiveness and employment objective are 60% and 75% respectively
of the total allocated cohesion policy funds (EuropeanCommission (2007)). In
total more than two thirds of cohesion policy funds are ’earmarked’ for Europe
2020 objectives. Under the convergence objective, 65% of total cohesion policy
funds are ’earmarked’; 74% and 59% of funds allocated to EU15 and EU12
respectively. Under the competitiveness and employment objective, 82% of
total cohesion policy funds are ’earmarked’; 83% and 59% of funds allocated
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to EU15 and EU12 respectively, although the number of programmes in EU12
under this objective is limited (EuropeanCommission (2007)). The largest
portion of allocated funds under the convergence objective is ’earmarked’ by
Austria, United Kingdom and Belgium, and under the competitiveness and
employment objective the largest portion of allocated funds is ’earmarked’ by
the Nordic countries—Sweden, Denmark and Finland—as well as Austria and
United Kingdom (EuropeanCommission (2007); Nordregio (2009)).
Clearly, Cohesion policy has become one of the key delivery mechanisms
through which the EU aims to deliver Europe 2020. This role has been as-
signed to Cohesion policy based on the premise that investment in innovation
and R&D on a regional level throughout the EU will boost the EU’s global
competitiveness and long term economic growth while at the same time boost-
ing regional development and economic growth. Furthermore the provisions
for ’earmarking’ cohesion policy funds ensure both that national strategies are
strategically co-ordinated towards achieving the objectives of Europe 2020 and
that significant resources, including those of member states, are directed to-
wards those objectives.11 Studies of disaggregated earmarking data have shown
that there has indeed been a shift in the focus of cohesion policy programmes
towards R&D and innovation away from infrastructure (Mendez (2011)).This
shift is evident even in EU12 member states, such as Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia,
Latvia, Cyprus and Czech Republic, who are not obliged to ’earmark’ cohesion
funds and who still require major investment in basic infrastructure (Mendez
(2011)).
Thus Cohesion policy has evolved to achieve a double objective: compet-
itiveness and cohesion. From the discussion above, it is apparent that the
focus of Cohesion policy is shifting increasingly towards the promotion of EU
competitiveness. This is evidenced by funds being allocated towards the com-
petitiveness and employment objective, for which convergence regions are not
eligible, as well as by the earmarking provisions. These attributes of Cohesion
policy result in a significant portion of funds being diverted away from the most
lagging member states to member states that are already relatively more, or
in cases highly, competitive. Furthermore funds are diverted away from basic
investment needs, such as infrastructure, to ’earmarked’ programmes in lag-
ging member states. In fact, competitive and technologically advanced EU15
11The Cohesion policy principle of additionality requires member state co-financing, stating
that Cohesion policy funds should not replace the national or equivalent expenditure by a
member state, which should, as a general rule, at least be equal to the amount of average
annual expenditure in the previous programming period (EuropeanUnion (2006c)).
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member states, including Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden and
United Kingdom, were able to allocate Cohesion policy funds allocated under
the competitiveness and employment objective to invest in national strategies
that promote innovation driven growth due to the alignment in national and
Europe 2020 objectives (Mendez (2011)). For example, Denmark, one of the
EU’s, and the world’s, most competitive countries, was able to invest 80% of
its total allocation (e0.6 billion) towards investment in R&D and innovation in
line with its national strategy based on the OECD’s ’growth drivers’ (Mendez
(2011)).12 Similarly, the Netherlands, another of the EU’s, and the world’s,
most competitive countries, was able to invest 49% of its total allocation (e1.9
billion) towards knowledge economy, entrepreneurship and innovation objec-
tives which included investment in several innovation clusters and innovation
programmes in line with its national strategy of ”backing winners” (Mendez
(2011), p528).13 Clearly such investments which enhance the competitiveness
of already competitive member states using Cohesion policy funds are contrary
to the spirit of cohesion and can only exacerbate disparities among member
states. It does not seem sensible that the most competitive and technologically
advanced economies in the EU continue to receive funds which further enhance
their competitiveness under a policy the objective of which is to reduce social
and economic disparities and to accelerate economic growth and development
in the most lagging economies.
T he role of Cohesion policy has evolved over the years since the inception
of the European Economic Community in 1957 from a policy tool essentially
focused on intergovernmental budgetary transfers to one focused on regional
development and economic growth (Mendez & Manzella (2009)). Following the
signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which inter alia aims to ensure ”har-
monious development by reducing the differences existing between the various
regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions” (EuropeanCommu-
nity (1957), Article 2, p4), Community regional policy operated as an inter-
governmental redistribution mechanism through funds established in favour of
least-favoured regions (EuropeanCommunity (1977); Armstrong (1978)).
12Denmark was ranked 3 in The Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report 2012 and 8 in The
Global Competitiveness Index 2012, both of which are compiled by the World Economic
Forum (WEF (2012a;b)).
13The Netherlands was ranked 4 in The Europe 2020 Competitiveness Report 2012 and 7 in
The Global Competitiveness Index 2012, both of which are compiled by the World Economic
Forum (WEF (2012a;b)).
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Regional policy was reformed in 1978 due to the recognition that little
progress had been made in the way of reducing regional disparities (European-
Community (1977)). Furthermore, it was recognised that the establishment
of the common market had resulted in increasing the uneven distribution of
economic activity and prosperity throughout the Community, especially be-
tween the richer regions and the less economically advanced regions who were
at a disadvantage in the process of integration into the common market (Euro-
peanCommunity (1977)). Thus the aims of regional policy became twofold: to
reduce existing regional imbalances in regions that were traditionally less de-
veloped or experiencing industrial or agricultural restructuring, and to reduce
new regional imbalances that may arise as a consequence of further economic
integration (EuropeanCommunity (1977)).
The most significant reforms in Cohesion policy took place in 1988. These
reforms were induced by the internal market programme and the accession of
Spain and Portugal in 1986 (and Greece in 1981) which had resulted in a sig-
nificant increase in economic disparities among member states. Prior to 1988,
Cohesion policy was concerned primarily with regional imbalances resulting
from industrial decline and structural unemployment. The recognition that
the internal market programme and increasing economic integration may fur-
ther negatively affect member states whose economies were less competitive
shaped Cohesion policy into a tool concerned with aiding economic restruc-
turing and regional economic growth and development (Mendez & Manzella
(2009)). This aspect is clearly evidenced by the introduction of the principle of
partnership to Cohesion policy which requires the involvement of regional and
local governments in the formulation and implementation of Cohesion policy.14
The partnership principle aims to promote regional development in line with
both regional needs and EU objectives, as well as to improve regional admin-
istrative and institutional capacities and capabilities through administrative
requirements imposed by Cohesion policy.
Thus, since its inception Cohesion policy has evolved from an intergovern-
mental budgetary transfer mechanism to a regional policy that is implemented
primarily through the promotion of regional development in order to promote
overall harmonious development and economic and social cohesion, in partic-
14The 1988 reforms to Cohesion policy introduced four principles to Cohesion policy:
concentration on objectives, programming involving multi-annual programmes presented by
member states and approved by the European Commission, partnership with regional and
local government, additionality requiring member state co-financing as Cohesion policy funds
are not a substitute for national expenditure (Mendez & Manzella (2009)).
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ular by reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various
regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions (EuropeanUnion
(2006b), Article 158, p118).
In the 2007-2013 programming period, with the introduction of the Lis-
bon Agenda and thereafter Europe 2020, Cohesion policy has assumed the
additional role of one of the principal policies through which the Europe 2020
economic growth strategy is to be realised, such that Cohesion policy con-
tributes to smart growth through the integration of regional development and
EU global competitiveness objectives (EuropeanUnion (2006c); EuropeanCom-
mission (2010b)). This fusion of regional development and EU competitiveness
objectives in Cohesion policy presents some problems, especially for most lag-
ging economies.
First, most lagging economies tend to lack the institutional capacity re-
quired for administering programmes relating to innovation and investment in
R&D. In general the majority of most lagging economies tend to lack the insti-
tutional capacity required for the effective absorption of Cohesion policy funds.
Second, the objectives of EU competitiveness are likely to be incompatible with
regional development objectives of most lagging economies since these econo-
mies are at a stage of economic development which is much less advanced than
that of the EU. Third, the nature of innovation and R&D activity lends itself
to developed and competitive economies and concentration since innovation
is driven by competitiveness in large markets and benefits from economies of
scale, collaboration and spillovers.
Firstly, lagging economies tend to lack the institutional capacity required for
administering Cohesion policy due to lack of skills and experience; even more so
they tend to lack the institutional capacity required for administering Cohesion
policy programmes relating to innovation and investment in R&D (IsmeriEu-
ropa (2010; 2012)). The administration of Cohesion policy requires the design,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of Cohesion policy programmes (Is-
meriEuropa (2010)). In the 2007-2013 programming period, a number of EU12
experienced significant delays in implementing Cohesion policy programmes
due to a lack of absorption capacity, skills and experience. Cohesion policy
programmes relating to innovation and investment in R&D showed the most
significant delays in terms of the selection of projects for Cohesion policy fi-
nancing (IsmeriEuropa (2012); EuropeanCommission (2013a)). EU12 tend to
lack a culture of innovation and business participation in innovation and R&D,
and further they tend to lack governance of innovation and R&D policy (Is-
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meriEuropa (2010)). In the 2007-2013 programming period, Cohesion policy
funds under the convergence objective in line with Europe 2020 were used to
invest in applied research, technology parks, clusters, centres of excellence,
incubators and similar kinds of intermediary research institutions, and related
infrastructure and equipment; however in EU12 there is some concern about the
sustainability of these initiatives; especially since there appears to be a gap in
the collaboration between universities and public research institutes, and firms
and industry, as well as the lack of an environment that is conducive to en-
terprise, competitiveness and innovation (IsmeriEuropa (2010)). Furthermore,
the earmarking of funds for programmes relating to innovation and investment
in R&D within the context of a lack of institutional capacity, especially with
respect to administering such Cohesion policy programmes, may result in de-
lays in the implementation of programmes and the selection of projects such
that it is more likely that Cohesion funds will not be received at all.15
Secondly, the objectives of EU competitiveness are likely to be incompatible
with the development objectives of most lagging economies. In particular the
earmarking of Cohesion policy funds may cause programmes to be chosen be-
cause they are aligned to Europe 2020 even though they may be incompatible
with development priorities. Earmarking may divert funds from investments
that are more relevant to most lagging economies such as infrastructure, hu-
man capital and institutional development (Mancha-Navarro & Garrido-Yserte
(2008)). Although it is recognised that innovation and technology are the
drivers of long term economic growth, the relative importance of innovation
and technology in economic growth depends crucially on an economy’s stage of
development (WEF (2012b)). Economic growth depends on the productivity
of each of the factors of production as well as on the institutional environ-
ment and economic environment in which they are embedded (OECD (2009)).
These various factors which affect the production capacity and efficiency of
an economy are interdependent and mutually reinforcing on each other and
on economic growth. Innovation and technology increases the productivity of
capital and labour; yet on the other hand, capital and labour are necessary to
enable the creation and diffusion of innovation and technology. Furthermore
the quality of the institutional and economic environment in which the factors
of production are embedded plays a crucial role in creating an environment
which is conducive to investment, enterprise, competition and innovation.
15Cohesion policy funds are decommitted if they have not been used within two years of
their comittment.
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Furthermore, significant financial resources are diverted from most lagging
economies and their development priorities as a result of the competitiveness
and employment objective, under which convergence regions are not eligible
for Cohesion policy funds, and the earmarking provisions, under which pro-
grammes may be selected in terms of their alignment with Europe 2020 rather
than their relevance to development priorities. This diversion of funds from
most lagging economies and their development priorities is problematic in that
in poorer economies investment in development is constrained by scarce fiscal
resources and is unlikely to occur without Cohesion policy funds, whereas richer
economies do not face such constraints (Begg (2009)).
Thirdly, the nature of innovation lends itself to developed economies and
concentration. Innovation can not be driven by financial resources alone. In-
novation is driven by competitiveness and the incentive to gain market power
and to earn profit. In a competitive environment firms are driven to innovate
in order to remain competitive and to stay in business. Having said this firms
are the key drivers of innovation in an economy, and their demand for inno-
vation is essentially the key driver of innovation and technology. In this light
the business environment is the setting for the demand of innovation and the
research environment, be it public or private, and its application to commercial
objectives, as well as accumulated knowledge in public and private entities is
the supply of innovation. Together innovation demand and supply create the
market for innovation and it is the efficient functioning of this market which
ultimately results in innovation and the creation and application of new tech-
nology.
The capacity for innovation and technology in an economy is determined
by both the productivity of factors of production and the institutional and eco-
nomic environment in which the factors of production are embedded. Various
factors influence the productivity of factors of production, for example effi-
cient infrastructure, highly skilled, educated and trained human capital, and
the accumulation and application of knowledge and technology in both public
and private entities. Various factors influence the efficient functioning of the
market for innovation market, for example the quality of institutions, laws and
regulations that favour innovation and the enterprise environment; primarily a
competitive environment.
Furthermore the capacity for technological innovation is determined by scale
and concentration, particularly with respect to investment in R&D (Rivera-
Batiz & Romer (1991)). First and foremost a large market facilitates invest-
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ment in R&D because it increases the prospects of profit by increasing returns
to scale and reducing the uncertainty of investment in R&D. Concentration of
innovation and research activity increases the rate of innovation and techno-
logical progress as it attracts capital, including human capital, and allows for
collaboration between researchers and spillover effects to researchers and firms.
Also, concentration of innovation and research activity increases the level and
rate of innovation and technology as it results in an accumulation of knowl-
edge and technology which facilitates discoveries of new ideas, technologies and





Theories of economic growth tend to agree on one thing: technological progress
is at the heart of long term economic growth. Although they differ in their for-
mulation as to the determinants of technological progress, theories of economic
growth concur that technological progress is the key driver of sustained long
term economic growth.
Broadly speaking, theories of economic growth developed in two waves,
from neoclassical growth models, during the 1950s and 1960s, in which tech-
nological progress is exogenously determined to endogenous growth models,
during the 1980s and 1990s, in which technological progress is endogenously
determined. Endogenous growth models which are based on the assumption of
perfect competition are limited in their ability to explain fully the incentives
for technological progress. However, once the assumption of perfect competi-
tion is replaced with that of imperfect competition, endogenous growth models
explain the incentives for technological progress in terms of market power and
profits.
The first wave of economic growth theory occurred during the 1950s and
1960s and relates primarily to neoclassical growth models which are based on
the assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Neoclas-
sical growth models focus on two aspects of economic growth, namely the de-
terminants of long term economic growth and the variation in economic growth
rates across countries.
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Neoclassical growth models explain long term economic growth in terms
of capital accumulation. However, capital exhibits diminishing returns such
that without technological progress, which increases the productivity of capital,
long term economic growth would eventually cease. Thus neoclassical growth
models show that technological progress, which is exogenously determined and
assumed to be constant, is the determinant of long term economic growth.
Neoclassical growth models predict that over the long term, and as a result
of diminishing returns to capital, economies tend towards a steady state in
which the rate of long term economic growth is constant. When an economy
deviates from steady state, its growth rate is determined by its distance from
steady state, as a result of diminishing returns to capital: the further an econ-
omy is from steady state, the faster it will grow. Neoclassical growth models
thus explain the variation in economic growth rates across countries.
The second wave of economic growth theory occurred during the 1980s and
1990s when economic growth theory was revived after a period of dormancy.
Research on economic growth stalled after the mid-1960s as neoclassical growth
models became highly technical and increasingly empirically irrelevant to de-
velopment economists and policymakers (Barro & SalaiMartin (2004)).
Research on economic growth during this period focuses on aspects of eco-
nomic growth which neoclassical growth models fail to explain. First, in neo-
classical growth models the determinant of long term economic growth, the
rate of technological progress, is exogenously determined. Thus endogenous
growth models focus on the determinants of technological progress in order to
determine the long term economic growth rate endogenously. Second, neoclas-
sical growth models predict constant long term economic growth rates which is
contrary to observations of increasing long term economic growth rates. Thus
endogenous growth models include production functions that exhibit increasing
returns to scale in order to explain increasing long term economic growth rates.
Endogenous growth models endogenise the determinants of technological
progress and explain increasing long term economic growth in a variety of for-
mulations, including capital accumulation in the form of human capital, pos-
itive spillovers resulting from investment in both physical and human capital,
and inputs such as knowledge that generate positive externalities. Initially,
endogenous growth models maintained the assumption of perfect competition.
In order to do this, increasing returns to scale deriving from technological
progress are assumed to be external to the firm. Since firms derive no benefit
from technological progress, they have no incentive to invest in technological
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progress. However, once the assumption of perfect competition is replaced with
that of imperfect competition, firms are able to internalise increasing returns to
scale deriving from technological progress, which enables them to earn profits
and to receive compensation for investment in technological progress. In this
way market power and the profit derived therefrom provides the incentive for
investment in technological progress.
The revival of economic growth theory during the 1980s and 1990s, and the
accompanying wave of new economic growth theories, led to numerous empirical
studies testing the predictions of the neoclassical growth model, and specifically
the prediction of convergence to steady state. This empirical research was
made possible by the release of new cross country datasets which enabled the
comparison of a large number of economies over a long period of time (Barro
& SalaiMartin (2004)).1
The recent economic growth research, compared to that of the 1960s, places
an emphasis on the relationship between theory and empirical data, and on the
empirical relevance of economic growth research to development economists
and policymakers (Barro & SalaiMartin (2004)).
4.1 Neoclassical Growth Models
In the 1950s and 1960s the most significant contributions to economic growth
theory were those of Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) who contributed to the
development of the neoclassical growth model as it is known today.
Solow (1956) built on the work of Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) by
relaxing the assumption that labour cannot be substituted for capital in pro-
duction; in other words the proportion of capital and labour need not remain
fixed in the production function (Harrod (1939); Domar (1946); Solow (1956)).
This strict assumption in the Harrod-Domar model predicts that long term
economic growth is ”at best balanced on a knife-edge of equilibrium growth”
(Solow (1956), p65). The Harrod-Domar model was accepted in its time, hav-
ing been developed after the Great Depression; although today it plays a small
role in the academic literature (Barro & SalaiMartin (2004)).
The following section presents a brief overview of the basic neoclassical
growth model as it forms the basis for much of the economic growth literature.
1For example, Maddison (1982); Summers & Heston (1991)
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The neoclassical growth model is based on two key equations: the produc-
tion function and the capital accumulation equation.
The production function describes the combination of inputs into the pro-
duction function in the form of capital and labour, and the resulting output.2





α = denotes the relative proportion of capital and labour
The production function is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale and
diminishing returns to capital.
Furthermore, it is assumed that competition is perfect: there are no eco-
nomic profits. The returns paid to capital are equal to the marginal product of
capital and wages paid to labour are to equal the marginal product of labour.
Output is used entirely to compensate capital owners and labour.
The capital accumulation function describes the rate at which capital ac-
cumulates. Capital increases with investment in capital and decreases with
depreciation.
K̇ = sY − dK (4.2)
where
K̇ = change in the capital stock
s = savings rate
d = depreciation rate
In the model it is assumed that capital owners and labour save a propor-
tion of their compensation and that the remainder is used for consumption;
the savings rate, s, is assumed to be constant over time and exogenously de-
2The neoclassical growth model was initially formulated excluding technology.
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termined. Further, it is assumed that the economy is closed so that all savings
are invested and all investments are used to accumulate capital. Depreciation
of capital occurs during the process of production; the depreciation rate, d, is
assumed to be constant and independent of the amount of output produced.
Since GDP per capita is the variable of interest in describing economic
growth, the production function and capital accumulation equations are rewrit-
ten in per capita terms, specifically output per worker and capital per worker
as follows:3
y = kα (4.3)
where
y = output per worker
k = capital per worker
and
k̇ = sy − (n+ d)k (4.4)
where
k̇ = change in capital per worker
n = population growth rate
In the model it is assumed that the population growth rate is constant over
time and exogenously determined.
Hence the mechanics of the model: Output per worker is dependent on
the capital-labour ratio and is proportional to capital per worker. The growth
rate of output per worker is equal to the growth rate of capital per worker.
The growth rate of capital per worker is determined by the savings rate, the
3In this description of the model GDP per capita will be used interchangeably with output
per worker. Strictly speaking the model is formulated in terms of output per worker, y, and
capital per worker, k. In the model it is assumed that the labour force participation rate
is constant so that the proportion of workers to the total population is constant. It is
convenient to assume that the labour force participation rate is 1, so that every member of
the population is also a worker and therefore output per worker is equivalent to GDP per
capita.
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population growth rate and the depreciation rate, all of which are exogenously
determined and assumed to be constant. Thus the growth rate of capital per
worker and therefore output per worker is determined exogenously.
A concept central to the neoclassical growth model is that of diminishing
marginal productivity of capital. This concept of diminishing returns implies
that the productivity of capital diminishes with each additional unit of capital;
in other words, output increases at a decreasing rate for each additional unit
of capital so that the increase in output derived from one additional unit of
capital is less than the increase in output derived from the previous unit of
capital. By implication, the lower an economy’s capital per worker, the higher
will be the contribution to output from an additional unit of capital and the
higher will be the economy’s growth rate. Thus the growth rate of output per
worker diminishes as capital increases and therefore long term economic growth
diminishes and eventually ceases to zero.
Deriving from the concept of diminishing returns to capital, the neoclassical
growth model predicts that over the long term economies tend towards steady
state. When in steady state an economy grows at a constant rate; the growth
rate of output per worker is equal to the growth rate of capital per worker which
is zero in the absence of technological progress. If an economy deviates from its
steady state, this deviation from steady state will result in a change in growth
rate which will last only temporarily until the economy adjusts and returns
once again to its steady state. If an economy is below its steady state, it will
grow at a faster rate until it reaches its steady state, and, due to the assumption
of diminishing returns, the further below its steady state an economy is, the
faster it will grow. Conversely, if an economy is above its steady state, it will
grow at a slower rate. Therefore the neoclassical growth model predicts that
the distance of an economy from its steady state will determine its growth rate
and that the growth rate will be positively related to the distance from steady
state (SalaiMartin (2006)). This is the concept of convergence.
The prediction that over the long term economies tend towards a long term
economic growth rate equal to zero is contrary to observations of long term
economic growth rates that are positive and tend to remain so over long pe-
riods of time. Thus, an element of technological progress was added to the
neoclassical growth model such that technology was included as an input into
the production function. Solow (1957) defines technological change to include
”any kind of shift in the production function” including ”slow downs, speed
ups, improvements in the education of the labor force, and all sorts of things”
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(Solow (1957), p312). Thus, for a given amount of inputs in the form of capital
and labour, technological progress enables a larger quantity of output to be pro-
duced or alternatively, a given quantity of output can be produced with fewer
inputs in the form of capital and labour. In this way the neoclassical growth
model predicts that the rate of growth in capital per worker and output per
worker is positive and equal to the rate of technological progress. The rate of
technological progress is determined exogenously and assumed to be constant.
Thus, the neoclassical growth model predicts that the rate of technological
progress determines the rate of long term economic growth, although the rate
of technological progress, and by implication the rate of long term economic
growth, is exogenously determined. Furthermore, the rates of saving, popula-
tion growth and depreciation which determine the rate of capital accumulation
are also exogenously determined and assumed to be constant.
Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965) independently extended the Solow-Swan
model by endogenously determining the savings rate. Cass (1965) and Koop-
mans (1965) based the determination of the savings rate on Ramsey (1928)’s
savings model. Ramsey (1928), in addressing his question of ”how much of
its income should a nation save?” (Ramsey (1928), p543), developed a model
which determines the proportion of income an economy should save in order to
maximize its future consumption utility across time. Ramsey (1928) assumes
a constant population and a constant level of technology.
The Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans neoclassical growth model is based on the
same assumptions as those in the Solow-Swan model, apart from the endoge-
nously determined savings rate (Cass (1965); Koopmans (1965)).
In the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model the predictions of steady state and
convergence continue to hold, deriving from diminishing returns to capital.
When in steady state an economy grows at a constant rate; in steady state
the growth rate of capital per worker and output per worker are equal to the
growth rate of consumption per worker, all three of which are equal to the rate
of technological progress. The rate of technological progress is exogenously
determined and assumed to be constant.
In the 1980s and 1990s during the revival of economic growth theory nu-
merous empirical studies testing the predictions of the neoclassical economic
growth model, and specifically the prediction of convergence to steady state,
were conducted.
The results of such empirical research on convergence were mixed. The
results of empirical research that was conducted based on samples of heteroge-
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nous economies across the world showed that there was a lack of convergence
worldwide. Indeed in some cases divergence seemed to be taking place (inter
alia DeLong (1988); Romer (1986)). In the midst of the wave of new economic
growth theory and new models of endogenous economic growth these results
were interpreted as a failing in the predictions of the neoclassical growth model.
However when such research was conducted based on samples of economies
sharing similar characteristics, the results showed that convergence was tak-
ing place. This led to the notion that economies did not necessarily have the
same steady state, but rather belonged to ”convergence clubs” (Baumol (1986),
p1079), being a group of economies that had similar characteristics and there-
fore similar steady states. As a result the distinction between the concepts of
conditional and absolute beta convergence was made, where absolute beta con-
vergence takes place only in the case when economies have similar steady states
(Barro & SalaiMartin (1991; 1992); SalaiMartin (2006)).4 Once this distinction
was taken into account in empirical research, the results showed that conver-
gence between countries tended to be in line with the predictions of the neo-
classical growth model (inter alia Mankiw et al. (1992); Barro & SalaiMartin
(1991; 1992); Barro (1996); Baumol & Wolff (1988)). On the contrary, Quah
(1996) suggests that convergence is not taking place; instead economies are
diverging such that the world income distribution will form ”twin peaks”, one
on either end of the income distribution (Quah (1996)).
4.2 Endogenous Growth Models
4.2.1 The Economic Nature of Technology
The concepts presented here relate to theories of endogenous economic growth
and are based on Romer (1990).
The costs related to the development and use of technology require imper-
fect competition.
Technological innovation is generated primarily through investment in R&D.
Investment in R&D has a fixed cost associated with it and an uncertain out-
come. The increase in investment in R&D does not result in a proportionate
increase in technology; in fact investment in R&D may yield no investment at
all.
4The concept of absolute beta convergence is that poor economies grow faster than rich
economies. Convergence is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
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Once new technology has been developed, it’s use has no additional costs
and it can be used over and over again. In other words the marginal cost of
the use of technology is zero. That is, the cost of the use of that technology to
produce an additional unit of output is zero; the only costs incurred are those
of capital and labour.
Under the assumption of perfect competition, firms are price takers and
all inputs are compensated at their marginal product: capital is compensated
at the marginal product of capital, labour at the marginal product of labour.
However, since the marginal product of technology is zero it receives no com-
pensation even though a fixed cost has been incurred to develop that technology.
Under the assumption of perfect competition, this cost structure has two
important implications. First, firms, being price takers, make losses as they
are not compensated for the fixed cost of their investment in the development
of technology since the marginal product of technology is zero. Consequently
they have no incentive to invest in the development of technology. Only if firms
are able to derive compensation for their investment in the development of
technology, will they have an incentive to do so. This requires the assumption
of imperfect competition and the ability to exclude others from the use of
that technology.5 Furthermore, the profits resulting from the development of
that technology, either through increased productivity and reduced costs or the
ability to receive a higher price, provide an additional incentive to invest in the
development of technology.
Second, the nonrivalrous6 nature of technology results in increasing returns
to scale. Whereas the required quantities of inputs of capital and labour in-
crease in proportion to increases in production, the required quantity of input
of technology does not since technology, once developed, can be used over and
over again. Furthermore, increases in production reduce the fixed costs associ-
ated with investment in the development of technology.
4.2.2 Endogenous Growth Models
Arrow (1962), prior to the wave of endogenous economic growth models in the
1980s and 1990s, endogenises the rate of technological progress by assuming
that increases in productivity are the result of ”learning by doing”—the ac-
5Excludability is a legal and technological attribute. A good is excludable if the owner
can prevent others from using it (Romer (1990))
6Rivalry is a purely technological attribute. A good is nonrivalrous if its use by one entity
in no way limits its use by another (Romer (1990))
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cumulation of knowledge and experience—during the production process. In-
creases in productivity result in increasing returns to scale; however these are
external to the firm since it is assumed that technological progress resulting
from ”learning by doing” is immediately publicly available and not compen-
sated by the market. Thus there is no incentive to invest in the development of
technology. Furthermore such technological progress is a by-product of produc-
tion and does not incur any costs; capital and labour are paid their marginal
products. Thus the assumption of perfect competition is maintained. An im-
portant implication of ”learning by doing” is that producers with an ”early
start” have a comparative advantage as they have a higher stock of knowledge
and experience relating to the production process; investment in capital ben-
efits producers in the present and in the future. Arrow (1962) does not take
into account explicitly the accumulation of knowledge and experience outside
of the production process and the effect of the quality of the labour force on
productivity.
Romer (1986) endogenises technological change by including knowledge as
an input into the production function. Crucially, knowledge has increasing
marginal product, as distinct from the other factors of production capital and
labour, which results in a production function that exhibits increasing returns
to scale. The assumption of perfect competition is maintained as increasing
returns are assumed to be external to the firm, as in the case of Arrow (1962).
Lucas (1988) endogenises technological change by including human capi-
tal as an input into the production function, as an alternative or complement
to technological change, in a way similar to that of Arrow (1962) and Romer
(1986). Lucas (1988)’s concept of human capital refers to the skill level of
labour and it is accumulated through both ”learning by doing” and educa-
tion. Human capital affects current productivity, but it also affects the future
accumulation of human capital. In the case of a closed economy, the initial en-
dowment of human capital will determine the steady state, so that economies
with a low initial human capital will reach a lower steady state and remain
poorer although their long term economic growth rate may be similar to that
of richer economies with a high initial human capital. In the case of an open
economy, human capital accumulation through ”learning by doing” is related
to the production of goods in which that economy specialises, so that economies
which specialise in goods with a low potential for the accumulation of human
capital will accumulate human capital at a lower rate, and by implication, will
have a lower economic growth rate. In this sense human capital accumulation
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will intensify the comparative advantages amongst economies over time, and
divergence between poorer and richer economies.
Romer (1990) first introduces the assumption of imperfect competition into
the endogenous growth model because the assumption of perfect competition
is incompatible with the determinants of technological progress: investment
in R&D is driven by the incentive to gain market power and to earn profit.
Romer (1990) is based on the neoclassical growth model augmented for the
assumption of imperfect competition which allows market participants to be
compensated for their investment in R&D, and furthermore provides an incen-
tive for firms, in the form of profits, to invest in R&D. In contrast to previous
models, Romer (1990) shows increasing returns to scale to be internal to firms
and thus explains the incentive to invest in the development of technology.
Romer (1990) emphasises the significant positive effect of human capital on
long term economic growth through its role in contributing to R&D.
Grossman & Helpman (1991) and Aghion & Howitt (1992) made significant
contributions to Romer (1990)’s R&D based economic growth model. These en-
dogenous growth models are based on Schumpeter (1943)’s idea of competition;
competition which is not perfect competition but rather ”the competition from
the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type
of organization. . . —competition which commands a decisive cost or quality ad-
vantage and which strikes. . . at their [firms] foundations and their very lives”
(Schumpeter (1943), p84). However, these endogenous growth models predict
that the long term economic growth rate is proportional to the amount of R&D
undertaken which is based on the number of researchers as a proportion of the
population. Therefore these models are problematic in that an increase in the
population results in an increase in long term economic growth. Subsequent
research made various adjustments for such effects of scale on economic growth;
however scale either in terms of the population or GDP per capita is shown to
play a significant role in long term economic growth (Jones (1999)).
4.3 Economic Integration
The theories of long term economic growth discussed above relate primarily
to a closed economy. This section presents literature relating to international
trade and economic integration and their relationship to long term economic
growth.
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Balassa (1961) defines economic integration in terms of varying degrees
of integration ranging from a free trade area to total economic integration
which requires monetary, fiscal, social and countercyclical policies as well as a
supranational authority whose decisions are binding for the member states.
Viner (1950) was one of the first contributors to the study of the welfare
effects of preferential trade and economic integration resulting from static effi-
ciency. Balassa (1965) expanded Viner (1950)’s analysis to include the welfare
effects of economic integration resulting from dynamic efficiency; that is, the
effects of scale economies and technological innovation on long term economic
growth. Balassa (1965) distinguishes the welfare effects of economic integra-
tion between those arising from an increase in real income and those arising
from the redistribution of real income; thus recognising that economic integra-
tion affects the geographical distribution of economic activity and real income
(Balassa (1965)).
Theories on the determinants of international trade and economic integra-
tion, as with theories on the determinants of long term economic growth, gen-
erally remained within the framework of perfect competition and static effi-
ciency which explained international trade in terms of the allocation of re-
sources among countries. International trade theory was based primarily on
factor proportions theory, which was derived from the concepts of comparative
advantage and relative factor endowments (Ricardo (1817); Heckscher (1919);
Ohlin (1933)); although the effects of economies of scale on international trade
had been recognised (Young (1928); Balassa (1965)).
The effects of increasing returns to scale on international trade were increas-
ingly recognised in the 1970s and 1980s which led to the development of new
trade theory. At first, international trade models included increasing returns to
scale but continued to be formulated such that increasing returns to scale were
external to firms in order to maintain the assumption of perfect competition.
Krugman (1979) first formulated a model based on the assumption of im-
perfect competition in which increasing returns to scale were internal to firms.7
Krugman (1979) shows that international trade occurs even if countries have
identical factor endowments and technology, which is contrary to factor pro-
portions theory. Instead Krugman (1979) shows that international trade is
determined by profits derived from increasing returns to scale which are in-
ternal to firms. Krugman (1979) shows that increases in the market increase
7Krugman (1979)’s model incorporates a market structure of monopolistic competition
based on Chamberlin (1962).
4. Literature: Economic Growth, Technological Progress, Economic Integration 35
economies of scale in production due to increased consumption. This idea goes
back to Smith (1776) that the division of labour is limited by the extent of
the market. Krugman (1979) defines the market in terms of labour force.8 In
the context of monopolistic competition economies of scale result in increasing
returns to scale which are internal to firms, decreasing prices and increasing
real wages. An increase in the market occurs through trade, in which both
trade partners benefit from an increase in the market; producers benefit from
economies of scale and increasing returns to scale, and consumers benefit from
decreasing prices and a greater quantity and variety of goods for consump-
tion. Economies of scale resulting from trade induce agglomeration economies
as producers seek monopolistic profits, and may induce migration towards ag-
glomeration economies in which consumers seek higher real wages, lower prices
and a larger quantity and variety of goods for consumption. The location of
agglomeration economies depends on the initial distribution of the market, or
in Krugman (1979)’s terms: the initial distribution of the labour force.
On the contrary Romer (1990), based on his model of endogenous economic
growth, emphasises that the market is defined in terms of human capital as
opposed to labour force and that it is a high level of human capital, not a
large population, which promotes international trade and long term economic
growth.
The idea of the significance of a large market on long term economic growth
is found also in Rivera-Batiz & Romer (1991), who further expand on the con-
cepts of increasing returns to scale and investment in R&D as the drivers of
long term economic growth. Rivera-Batiz & Romer (1991) show that economic
integration, which includes both the flow of goods and ideas, can increase long
term economic growth of integrated economies if the R&D sector benefits from
economies of scale and increasing returns to scale, even if economies have iden-
tical factor endowments and technology. An integrated R&D sector increases
efficiency of investment in R&D as the overall fixed costs relating to the de-
velopment of (the same) ideas do not need to be incurred more than once.
Furthermore an integrated R&D sector increases productivity of investment in
R&D as it increases the overall stock of knowledge from which future ideas can
be derived. The flow of goods and ideas diffuse technology across countries and
can increase the benefits of increasing returns to scale in two ways: first, the
flow of goods and ideas reduces duplication of effort in generating ideas and
8The labour force is equivalent to population, as each member of the population is assumed
to be a worker. Furthermore, the labour force represents the consumers.
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technology that already exist and second, the flow of goods and ideas increase
the availability of ideas and technology that can be used in the generation of
future ideas and technology.
Baldwin (1989) distinguishes between the short term and long term effects of
economic integration, based on Balassa (1965)’s concept of dynamic efficiency.
In the short term, and based on the neoclassical growth model, the efficient
reallocation of resources increases the productivity of capital and the economic
growth rate; however, due to diminishing returns to scale, the rate of economic
growth eventually returns to its steady state although the level of steady state
may be increased. In the long term, and based on Romer (1986)’s endogenous
growth model, inputs such as knowledge into the production function in the
context of a large market result in increasing returns to scale and an increasing
rate of economic growth in the long term.
Grossman & Helpman (1990), in a series of papers, use the concept of factor
endowments and comparative advantage in the R&D sector to study the effects
of R&D and R&D subsidies on international trade and long term economic
growth (Grossman & Helpman (1990)). They show that international trade
between countries with different initial factor endowments and comparative
advantages in the R&D sector will result in the reallocation of resources within
each country between the R&D sector and the manufacturing sector, and that
the effects on economic growth resulting from this reallocation are complicated
and, in cases, indeterminate. For example, if resources are reallocated to R&D
in a country that has a comparative disadvantage in the R&D sector, through
an R&D subsidy for example, then the resulting reallocation of resources among
countries may result in decreased innovation and economic growth worldwide as
R&D resources within a country that has a comparative advantage in the R&D
sector shift out of the R&D sector. On the contrary, if resources are reallocated
to R&D in a country that has a comparative advantage in the R&D sector,
then innovation and economic growth worldwide must increase (Grossman &
Helpman (1990)). Comparative advantage, however, may be acquired through
trade if trade increases the rate of human capital accumulation or the rate of
technology diffusion.
Baldwin & Venables (1995), in their survey of literature on economic in-
tegration, classify the effects relating to economic integration into three cate-
gories which are currently widely recognised in the literature relating to eco-
nomic integration. Allocation effects relate to the static allocation of resources,
scale economies and imperfect competition. Accumulation effects relate to the
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medium and long term effects of changes in returns on investment which affect
the accumulation of capital, including physical, human or knowledge capital.
Location effects relate to the location of firms, and linkages and tendencies for
the formation of agglomeration economies.
Chapter 5
Convergence in the EU
5.1 The Concept and Measurement of Conver-
gence
There are two concepts of convergence in the classical literature, namely beta
convergence and sigma convergence (SalaiMartin (2006)).1 Beta convergence
relates to the speeds at which economies grow over time, whereas sigma conver-
gence relates to the change in disparities in GDP per capita across economies
over time. Both beta convergence and sigma convergence are measured in terms
of GDP per capita.
5.1.1 Beta Convergence: Conditional and Absolute
The concept of beta convergence derives directly from the neoclassical growth
model, specifically its prediction that over the long term economies tend to-
wards steady state as a result of diminishing returns to capital (Solow (1956)).
When in steady state an economy grows at a constant rate. If an economy
deviates from its steady state, this deviation from steady state will result in
a change in growth rate which will last only temporarily until the economy
adjusts and returns once again to its steady state. If an economy is below
its steady state, it will grow at a faster rate until it reaches its steady state,
and, due to the assumption of diminishing returns, the further below its steady
state an economy is, the faster it will grow. Conversely, if an economy is
above its steady state, it will grow at a slower rate. Therefore the neoclassical
growth model predicts that the distance of an economy from its steady state
1This terminology was first introduced by SalaiMartin (1990) (SalaiMartin (2006))
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will determine its growth rate and that the growth rate will be positively related
to the distance from steady state (SalaiMartin (2006)). This is the concept of
conditional beta convergence.
The concept of absolute beta convergence is that poor economies grow faster
than rich economies. The concept of absolute beta convergence, like that of
conditional beta convergence, derives from the neoclassical growth model’s pre-
diction that over the long term economies tend towards steady state. The dif-
ference between conditional and absolute beta convergence, however, is that
absolute beta convergence assumes that economies have similar steady states.
When economies have similar steady states, a poor economy grows at a
faster rate than a rich economy since it will be further away from its steady
state. On the contrary, when economies do not have similar steady states, a
poor economy will not necessarily grow at a faster rate than a rich economy
because each economy’s growth rate is determined by its position relative to
its own steady state. For example, a poor economy that is close to its steady
state will grow at a slower rate than a rich economy that is far from its steady
state.
Steady state can be determined by a variety of factors. Based on the neo-
classical growth model steady state is determined by, for example, the stock of
capital and labour, and the rates of technological progress, saving and popula-
tion growth (Solow (1956)). Recent research has determined that other factors
such as social preferences and institutional characteristics also play a role in
determining steady state (Barro (1996)).
Beta convergence is generally measured by estimating a growth equation in
the general form (SalaiMartin (2006)):2
γi,t,t+T = α− blog(yi,t) + εi,t,t+T (5.1)
for
γi,t,t+T ≡ log(yi,t+T/yi,t)/T
2This equation is based on the assumption that economies have similar steady states
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and
b = (1 − e−βT )/T
where
log(yi,t+T/yi,t)/T = annualised growth rate of GDP per capita
log(yi,t) = logarithm of initial GDP per capita at time t
T = length of time between two observations
If β>0 then absolute beta convergence is taking place.
In order to test the hypothesis of conditional beta convergence it is necessary
to hold constant the steady state of each economy (SalaiMartin (2006)). This
can be done in two ways.
The first method to hold constant the steady state is to include a set of
variables that proxy for the steady state of each economy, in other words a set
of factors that are specific to an economy and that are likely to determine its
steady state (SalaiMartin (2006)). In this case (5.1) is adjusted to:
γi,t,t+T = α− blog(yi,t) + ΦXi,t + εi,t,t+T (5.2)
where
Xi,t = vector of variables that hold constant the steady state
If β>0 then conditional beta convergence is taking place.
The second method to hold constant the steady state is to include in the
sample only economies for which it is reasonable to assume similar steady
states (SalaiMartin (2006)). With this method the hypothesis of conditional
beta convergence can be tested using (5.1).
The rate of conditional beta convergence is generally faster than the rate
of absolute beta convergence as poor economies are likely to be closer to their
steady state in the case of conditional beta convergence than to a steady state
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which is similar to that of rich economies in the case of absolute beta conver-
gence (Monfort (2008)).
Clearly the results for such a measure of beta convergence are highly depen-
dent on the selection of the model specification, with regards to either absolute
or conditional beta convergence and, in the case of conditional beta conver-
gence, on the selection of the set of variables or alternatively the sample of
economies to be included to hold constant the steady state (Monfort (2008)).
The use of an average growth rate of GDP per capita to measure convergence
may hide the effects of the dynamic characteristics of economic growth and
economic shocks on convergence (Quah (1993)).
The measure of beta convergence does not provide information regarding
either the changes in the level of GDP per capita or the changes in the dis-
tribution of GDP per capita across economies over time, which may be more
insightful (Quah (1993); SalaiMartin (2006)).
5.1.2 Sigma Convergence
While the concept of beta convergence relates to the speeds at which economies
grow over time, the concept of sigma convergence relates to the change in
disparities in GDP per capita across economies over time. Clearly the concepts
of beta convergence and sigma convergence are related because a poor economy
will have to grow at a faster rate than a rich economy in order to catch up;
however, the existence of beta convergence will not necessarily result in sigma
convergence (SalaiMartin (2006)). A poor economy may grow at a faster rate
than a rich economy but the disparity in GDP per capita may not change over
time, for example, if the economies converge to different steady states or if
economic shocks push the economies further apart. Therefore, although beta
convergence is a necessary condition for sigma convergence to take place, beta
convergence alone is not sufficient to result in sigma convergence (SalaiMartin
(2006)). Said in a different way, the distribution of GDP per capita across
economies may not change over time, although economies may move within
that distribution of GDP per capita.
Sigma convergence is generally measured in terms of the standard deviation
of a distribution of GDP per capita. Sigma convergence is measured using
various other measures also, which include for example the Theil index, the Gini
coefficient, the Atkinson index and the Mean Logarithmic Deviation (Monfort
(2008)).
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This section will focus on two measures of sigma convergence, namely the
coefficient of variation and the Theil index.
The coefficient of variation is a measure of the standard deviation of a
probability distribution of GDP per capita (TheWorldBank (1999)).
The coefficient of variation is defined as:
cv = σ/µ (5.3)
where
σ = standard deviation
µ = mean
The coefficient of variation indicates the degree of variance of GDP per
capita in relation to the mean; therefore it is more informative than if the
standard deviation were presented on its own (Monfort (2008)).
The Theil index belongs to the Generalised Entropy class of measures, a
characteristic of which is that they can be decomposed into components of
within-group inequality and between-group inequality (TheWorldBank (1999)),
such that:
Inequalitytotal = Inequalitywithin + Inequalitybetween
In the general formula for the Generalised Entropy class of measures the
parameter α weights the distances between incomes at different parts of the
income distribution, such that lower values of α correspond to more sensitivity
of the measure to changes in the lower tail of the distribution and higher values
of α correspond to more sensitivity of the measure to changes in the upper tail
of the distribution.
The Theil index has α=1, such that it weights equally the distances between
incomes at different parts of the income distribution (Theil (1967); TheWorld-
Bank (1999)).
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where






yi = arithmetic mean of GDP per capita
5.2 Convergence in the EU
This section aims to test the hypothesis of convergence in the EU with respect
to both beta convergence and sigma convergence. It is expected that both beta
convergence and sigma convergence are taking place in the EU. In the context
of significant disparities in GDP per capita across EU member states, the pres-
ence of sigma convergence is of greater interest than that of beta convergence,
although beta convergence is a necessary condition for sigma convergence to
take place. Furthermore sigma convergence relates directly to the objectives of
EU Cohesion policy, specifically with respect to the reduction of disparities in
GDP per capita across member states.
The measures for beta convergence and sigma convergence are calculated
based on real GDP per capita (PPP indexed to 2005 international dollar) for the
27 EU member states. The data are obtained from the Penn World Table 7.1,
with 1971 being the earliest available year (Heston et al. (2012)). The data are
complete for the period 1971-2010 for all countries except for Slovakia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia and Lithuania.3 For the years in which data
are missing, the measures are calculated based on the number of countries for
which data are available and the calculations are adjusted accordingly where
necessary.4
Luxembourg is identified as an outlier. In 2010 Luxembourg’s real GDP
per capita was I$75,5905, whereas the next highest GDP per capita in the EU,
that of Austria, was I$38,586. Luxembourg’s real GDP per capita has been in
the region of 1.5 to 2 times that of the next highest GDP per capita during
the 1990s and 2000s, showing an increasing trend which started in the second
3For Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia and Lithuania, data are complete
for the periods detailed as follows: Slovakia: 1987-2010; Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia:
1990-2010; Latvia, Lithuania: 1993-2010
41971-1986: 21 countries; 1987-1989: 22 countries; 1990-1992: 25 countries; 1993-2010:
27 countries
5PPP indexed to 2005 international dollar
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half of the 1980s. For this reason the measures for beta convergence and sigma
convergence excluding Luxembourg are also calculated and presented alongside
the measures calculated for the 27 EU member states.
5.2.1 Beta Convergence in the EU
This section aims to test the hypothesis of beta convergence in the EU. The
hypothesis will be tested using as an estimate a growth equation in the form
(5.1) (SalaiMartin (2006)). It is expected that beta convergence is taking place
in the EU.
The measure for beta convergence is calculated based on real GDP per
capita for the 27 EU member states for the periods 1993-2010 and 2000-2010.
The 1993-2010 period is selected as 1993 is the earliest year for which the data
are complete. The 2000-2010 period is selected for comparative purposes as it
corresponds to the period selected for the empirical model in Chapter 6.
In testing the hypothesis of beta convergence it is important to make the
distinction between conditional and absolute beta convergence by determining
whether economies have similar steady states, and to select the model specifica-
tion accordingly. If economies do not have similar steady states, it is necessary
to hold constant the steady state of each economy.
In testing the hypothesis of beta convergence in the EU, it is assumed that
the 27 EU member states have similar steady states; thus the model specifi-
cation in (5.1) is selected as an estimate. This model specification essentially
measures absolute beta convergence, where β>0 indicates that absolute beta
convergence is taking place, and β measures the speed of convergence.
It is considered not unreasonable to assume that the 27 EU member states
have the same steady state for the following reasons.
The GDP per capita growth rate is plotted against initial GDP per capita
for the 27 EU member states (excluding Luxembourg) for the periods 1993-
2010 and 2000-2010 as shown in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 respectively.6 The trend
shows that member states with a lower initial GDP per capita tend to grow at
a faster rate than member states with a higher initial GDP per capita. This
observation corresponds to the concept of absolute beta convergence which
holds when economies have similar steady states.
Secondly, the economies of the 27 EU member states are likely to have sim-
ilar steady states if the factors that determine steady state are similar across
6GDP per capita is measured in terms of natural logarithm
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Figure 5.1: GDP per capita and growth rate 1993-2010
Figure 5.2: GDP per capita and growth rate 2000-2010
those economies. Such factors include, for example, the stock of capital and
labour, and the rates of technological progress, saving and population growth,
as well as social preferences and institutional characteristics (Solow (1956);
Barro (1996)). The 27 EU member states are economically similar when con-
sidered on a worldwide level. Furthermore, the factors that determine steady
state are relatively similar, particularly institutional characteristics, social pref-
erences with respect to savings, leisure and fertility, as well as factors relating
to technological progress, education attainment, rates of investment and popu-
lation change. In addition, EU economic integration and monetary union and
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the Single Market which allows the free mobility of goods, services, labour and
capital is likely to induce greater similarity in the factors that determine steady
state.
Lastly, the objective of the Treaty on European Union of a high degree of
convergence of economic performance as well as the objective of Cohesion policy
to reduce disparities across member states implies that the 27 EU member
states are likely to have similar steady states (EuropeanUnion (2006b;c)).
Figure 5.3: Estimation Results: Absolute Beta Convergence for EU27
and EU27 excluding Luxembourg
The results for the measure of absolute beta convergence in terms of the
growth equation estimations for the periods 1993-2010 and 2000-2010 are pre-
sented in Figure 5.3.7
The variables ln20051993 and ln20052000 are equal to the natural logarithm
of initial GDP per capita in 1993 and 2000 respectively, and the related result
in the respective columns indicates the value of the b coefficient in (5.1).
The b coefficient is negative and statistically significant for both the 1993-
2010 and 2000-2010 periods, whether or not Luxembourg is included in the
estimation, which indicates that absolute beta convergence is taking place.
The b coefficient is used to calculate the estimated speed of convergence, β,
in terms of (5.1).
The speed of convergence, β, is calculated for the periods 1993-2010 and
2000-2010 at 1.6% per year (1.9% per year excluding Luxembourg) and 2.6%
per year (3.1% per year excluding Luxembourg) respectively. β>0 for both
periods indicates that absolute beta convergence is taking place.
The speed of absolute beta convergence is greater for the 2000-2010 period
which may be the result of increased convergence due to increased economic
integration of EU12 resulting from the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, includ-
7Columns 1 and 2 present the results for the period 1993-2010, where column 2 presents
the results excluding Luxembourg; similarly, columns 3 and 4 present the results for the
period 2000-2010, where column 4 presents the results excluding Luxembourg
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ing economic integration resulting from pre-accession, or due to the recovery
of EU128 from the economic shock of transition from planned to market econ-
omy which started in 1989. In either case, as reflected in Figures 5.1 and 5.2,
the GDP per capita growth rates of many EU12 member states increased in
the period 2000-2010. The speed of absolute beta convergence is greater when
Luxembourg is excluded for both the 1993-2010 and 2000-2010 periods.
The speeds of convergence, which are in the region of 2%, are in line with
the ”iron-law” rate of 2% (Barro (2012)). SalaiMartin (2006) estimates the
speed of convergence to be within a narrow range centring on 2% per year;
and the results of numerous studies of convergence reflect similar speeds of
convergence (Barro (1996); SalaiMartin (2006); Barro (2012)). However, a
speed of convergence at 2% per year is ”quite slow” (SalaiMartin (2006), p1035)
since it would take thirty five years to reduce the distance between initial GDP
per capita and steady state by half (SalaiMartin (2006)).
In conclusion, the results show that absolute beta convergence is taking
place in the EU.
5.2.2 Sigma Convergence in the EU
This section aims to test the hypothesis of sigma convergence in the EU. The
hypothesis will be tested using two measures of sigma convergence, namely
the coefficient of variation and the Theil index. It is expected that sigma
convergence is taking place in the EU.
The measures for sigma convergence are calculated based on real GDP per
capita for the 27 EU member states for the period 1971-2010.9 The data are
complete for the period 1971-2010 for all countries except for Slovakia, Czech
Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia and Lithuania.10 For the years in which
data are missing, the measures are calculated based on the number of countries
for which data are available and the calculations are adjusted accordingly where
necessary.11
The measures for sigma convergence are further analysed for both EU1512
8except for Cyprus and Malta
91971 is the earliest year for which data are available.
10For Slovakia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Latvia and Lithuania, data are complete
for the periods detailed as follows: Slovakia: 1987-2010; Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia:
1990-2010; Latvia, Lithuania: 1993-2010
111971-1986: 21 countries; 1987-1989: 22 countries; 1990-1992: 25 countries; 1993-2010:
27 countries
12EU15 are the ’old’ member states, including member states that acceded to the EU prior
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and EU1213 separately in order to determine whether sigma convergence is
taking place within each of these two groups, as well as to analyse the sources
of sigma convergence (or divergence) between the 27 EU member states.
Figure 5.4: Coefficient of variation for EU27 and EU27 excluding
Luxembourg
The results for the measures of sigma convergence for the 27 EU member
states in terms of the coefficient of variation and the Theil index are presented
in Figures 5.4 and 5.5 respectively.
The coefficient of variation and the Theil index for the 27 EU member states
show a similar trend for sigma convergence. The variance in GDP per capita
is at its lowest levels during the late 1970s and 1980s. In 1989 the variance
in GDP per capita increases significantly, to its highest levels, and remains at
these high levels during the 1990s, decreasing again only after 2000 to levels
not quite as low as those seen in the late 1970s and 1980s.
The significant increase in the variance in GDP per capita in 1989, to its
highest levels, corresponds to the start of the transition from planned to market
economy for the transition economies in EU12; this transition caused a signif-
icant economic shock to the transition economies. The transition economies,
previously relatively homogenous in an economic sense due to their being part
to 2004: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom
13EU12 are the ’new’ member states, including member states that acceded to the EU in
2004 or thereafter: Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania
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Figure 5.5: Theil Index for EU27 and EU27 excluding Luxembourg
of a centrally planned economy, became increasingly heterogenous as they fol-
lowed varying paths in their transition from planned to market economy and
were subject to varying economic and political forces.
The decreasing trend in the variance in GDP per capita in the 2000s cor-
responds to increased GDP per capita growth rates in EU12 and an increased
speed of absolute beta convergence for the period 2000-2010 as observed in
section 5.2.1. This result is in line with the expectation that beta convergence
is a necessary condition for sigma convergence to take place. Increases in sigma
convergence during the 2000s, similarly to beta convergence discussed above,
may be due to the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, including economic inte-
gration resulting from pre-accession, or due to the recovery of EU1214 from the
economic shock of transition from planned to market economy.
The variance in GDP per capita shows an increasing trend after 2008 to
2010, the last year for which data are available. This increase corresponds to
the start of the 2008 global financial crisis and Euro sovereign debt crisis. The
extent of the increase in the variance in GDP per capita as a result of this
economic shock remains to be seen as the consequences of the crises continue
to be played out.
The coefficient of variation and the Theil index excluding Luxembourg show
a similar trend for sigma convergence in the EU, to that when Luxembourg
14except for Cyprus and Malta
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is included. It is clear, however, that Luxembourg accounts for a significant
amount of the variance in GDP per capita in the EU; an increasing trend which
started in the mid-1980s. In fact, the variance in GDP per capita excluding
Luxembourg in the late 2000s reaches levels lower than those seen in the late
1970s and 1980s.
Figure 5.6: Coefficient of variation for EU15 and EU12 excluding
Luxembourg
Figure 5.7: Theil Index for EU15 and EU12 excluding Luxembourg
The results for the measures of sigma convergence for EU15 and EU12
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in terms of the coefficient of variation and the Theil index are presented in
Figures 5.6 and 5.7 respectively.
It is important to note that a similar measure of sigma convergence for
EU15 and EU12 does not indicate that the level of GDP per capita is similar
for EU15 and EU12; it does indicate that within each group the variance in
GDP per capita is similar.
The coefficient of variation and the Theil index show a similar trend for
sigma convergence in EU15 and EU12.
It is clear, once again, that Luxembourg accounts for a significant amount
of the variance in GDP per capita in EU15. The variance in GDP per capita
in EU15, excluding Luxembourg, is at its lowest and remains stable for the
period from the mid-1980s to 2010, the last year for which data are available.
This decrease, albeit small, in variance in GDP per capita corresponds to the
launch of the Single Market Programme with the signing of the Single European
Act in 1986. This may imply that EU economic integration among EU15 has
promoted sigma convergence in EU15, or conversely that EU15 economies have
similar levels of GDP per capita regardless of EU economic integration.
On the contrary, the variance in GDP per capita in EU12 is highly volatile
and is clearly the key driver of the trend in variance in GDP per capita in
the 27 EU member states. The variance in GDP per capita in EU12 increased
significantly in 1989 and decreased again only after 2000. As discussed above,
this increase in variance in GDP per capita in 1989 corresponds to the start
of the transition from planned to market economy, and the decrease after 2000
may may be due to the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements or due to the recovery of
EU1215 from the economic shock of transition from planned to market economy.
It is interesting to note, however, that the variance in GDP per capita in
EU12 was at levels similar to those in EU15 during the 1980s prior to EU acces-
sion. This implies that factors other than EU economic integration promoted
sigma convergence in EU12, to its lowest levels, during the 1980s.
In conclusion, the results show that sigma convergence is taking place in
the EU.
15except for Cyprus and Malta
Chapter 6
Policy Focus for Reducing
Disparities in GDP per capita
across the EU
How can disparities in GDP per capita across member states be reduced? Cer-
tainly poorer member states should promote faster economic growth in order
to catch up to richer member states. However, economic growth is limited by
an economy’s level and quality of factors of production, technology, institutions
and economic environment.
Based on the neoclassical growth model, if member states have similar
steady states and absolute beta convergence is taking place in the EU then
eventually member states will converge to similar levels of GDP per capita,
although this may take a very long time. On the contrary, if member states
do not have similar steady states, convergence in GDP per capita levels may
never take place although economic growth rates may converge. Steady state
embodies the production capacity and efficiency of an economy for a given set
of factors of production, technology, institutions and economic environment;
let’s call this the economic set. Technological innovation, for a given economic
set, increases steady state as it increases the potential of the production capac-
ity and efficiency of an economy; that is, it increases the economy’s potential
for an increased steady state and sustained economic growth in the future. The
elements in the economic set and technological innovation are interdependent
and mutually reinforcing on economic growth, while the relative importance of
each element depends crucially on the economy’s stage of development. Ac-
cordingly, increasing the level and quality of the economic set and increasing
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technological innovation, while acknowledging the interdependence of these fac-
tors as well as the economy’s stage of development, leads to increases in the
production capacity and efficiency of an economy presently and increases in its
potential for an increased steady state and sustained economic growth in the
future.
Based on the neoclassical growth model, economic policy can influence the
steady state growth rate of GDP per capita only temporarily; while it can influ-
ence the steady state level of GDP per capita permanently and cumulatively.
Thus, with the aim of informing Cohesion policy, the model presented in
this section focuses not on the growth rate of GDP per capita, but instead on
the level of GDP per capita. Specifically, the model aims firstly, to determine
those factors, in terms of Cohesion policy, most associated with high levels of
GDP per capita and secondly, to provide a basis for informing the key policy
focus areas of Cohesion policy for the reduction of disparities in GDP per capita
across member states. The model and resulting recommendations are in the
context of the approach toward the new Cohesion policy programming period
for 2014-2020, which continues to focus on the objectives of Europe 2020, and
in the context of the current economic environment in the EU and globally.
6.1 Methodology and Model Specification
The model aims to determine those factors, in terms of Cohesion policy, most
associated with high levels of GDP per capita. The variables of interest are
innovation and technology and human capital. These variables were selected
for three reasons: First, they relate to objectives of Europe 2020; this enables
an analysis of the compatibility of Europe 2020 objectives, in terms of EU com-
petitiveness and economic growth, and Cohesion policy objectives, in terms of
the reduction of disparities in GDP per capita across member states. Second,
based on the economic growth literature, they are considered to have a signif-
icant influence on steady state; this enables an analysis of those factors most
associated with high levels of GDP per capita across member states. Third,
they are able to be influenced through Cohesion policy; this enables the tar-
geted use of Cohesion policy in the reduction of disparities in GDP per capita
across member states.
Member states are heterogenous, and country-specific characteristics will
surely influence GDP per capita. The aim of the model is to analyse the
relationship between GDP per capita and specifically the variables of interest,
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namely innovation and technology and human capital; the determinants of
GDP per capita are not of interest. Panel data analysis is used as it enables
the analysis of the effects on GDP per capita of changes in the variables of
interest while controlling for country-specific characteristics and unobserved
effects that do not change over time.
The fixed effects and first difference estimators were selected, although the
random effects estimator was also considered, because the fixed effects and
first difference estimators eliminate time constant country-specific characteris-
tics, even if these variables are unobserved.1 This elimination of time constant
variables allows for the analysis to concentrate on the effects on GDP per capita
of the variables of interest; while on the other hand, it restricts the analysis
to variables that change over time. In other words, the fixed effects and first
difference estimators cannot estimate the effects of time constant variables or
variables that change little over time, such as institutional quality or geograph-
ical region. In this sense the fixed effects and first difference estimators are
limited in their ability to estimate the determinants of GDP per capita. On
the contrary, the random effects estimator can be used to estimate the effects
of time constant or slow changing variables and the determinants of GDP per
capita.
A second reason for the selection of the fixed effects and first difference es-
timators is related to the assumption of strict exogeneity which determines the
consistency of the estimators. The assumption of strict exogeneity requires that
the independent variables are not correlated with the error term, which is com-
posed of a time constant error, relating to time constant country-specific char-
acteristics, and an idiosyncratic error, which is random. The fixed effects and
first difference estimators are based on the assumption that the independent
variables are not correlated with the idiosyncratic error, while the independent
variables are allowed to be arbitrarily correlated with the constant error. The
random effects estimator is much more restrictive in respect of this assumption
as it requires that the independent variables are not correlated with both the
constant error and the idiosyncratic error. In the context of this model, it
seems unrealistic to assume that the independent variables are not related to
time constant country-specific characteristics and are therefore not correlated
with the constant error, especially considering the short time period used in
this model. For example, investment in R&D is found to be correlated with
1The interpretation of the coefficients for the fixed effects and first difference estimators
is the same, only the method of estimation differs (Wooldridge (2010))
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geographical region. In the case that the independent variables are correlated
with the constant error, the assumption of strict exogeneity pertaining to the
random effects estimator will not hold, and the estimator will be inconsistent.
6.1.1 Fixed Effects
The fixed effects estimator general specification is:
yi,t = βXi,t + ui,t + εi,t (6.1)
where
Xi,t = set of observed independent variables
ui,t = constant error which does not vary over time
εi,t = idiosyncratic error which varies over time
The fixed effect estimator model specification is:
lngdppci,t = β1rdi,t + β2edi,t + β3empi,t + γZi,t + ui,t + εi,t (6.2)
where
lngdppci,t = ln of real GDP per capita
rdi,t = innovation and technology in terms of investment in R&D
edi,t = human capital in terms of education
empi,t = human capital in terms of employment
Zi,t = set of observed control variables
ui,t = constant error which does not vary over time
εi,t = idiosyncratic error which varies over time
6.1.2 First Difference
The first difference estimator general specification is:
∆yi,t = ∆Xi,tβ + ∆εi,t (6.3)
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where
∆yi,t = yi,t − yi,t−1
∆Xi,t = Xi,t −Xi,t−1
∆εi,t = εi,t − εi,t−1
The first difference estimator model specification is:
∆lngdppci,t = ∆rdi,tβ1 + ∆edi,tβ2 + ∆empi,tβ3 + ∆Zi,tγ + ∆εi,t (6.4)
6.2 Dataset
A panel dataset was constructed comprising 27 EU member states for the
11 year period 2000-2010. Luxembourg was identified as an outlier and is
consequently excluded from estimations. The panel is strongly balanced.
The dataset was constructed using data obtained from the following the
databases:
1. Penn World Table v7.1 (2012), 1971-2010 (Heston et al. (2012))
2. Barro-Lee A New Data Set of Educational Attainment in the World
(2013), 1950-2010 (Barro & Lee (2013))
3. Eurostat (2013) (Eurostat (2013))
6.3 Variables and their Measurement
6.3.1 Real GDP per capita
Real GDP per capita is the dependent variable since the model aims to de-
termine those factors, in terms of Cohesion policy, most associated with high
levels of GDP per capita across member states.
Real GDP per capita is measured in terms of the natural logarithm of real
GDP per capita (PPP indexed to 2005 international dollar). The data were
obtained from the Penn World Table v7.1 (Heston et al. (2012)). The data are
complete for the period 2000-2010 for all countries.
6. Policy Focus for Reducing Disparities in GDP per capita across the EU 57
6.3.2 Innovation and Technology
Innovation and technology is a variable of interest since it relates to the primary
objectives of Europe 2020.2 Cohesion policy has been identified as one of the
key delivery mechanisms of the Europe 2020 strategy based on the premise that
investment in innovation and R&D on a regional level throughout the EU will
boost the EU’s global competitiveness and long term economic growth while
at the same time boosting regional development and economic growth, and
thereby reducing disparities in GDP per capita across member states.
Secondly, innovation and technology is considered to have two significant
effects on GDP per capita. Innovation and technology increases the produc-
tion capacity and efficiency of an economy presently for a given set of factors
of production, technology, institutions and economic environment. Such inno-
vation is in terms of the development of unique products and processes and
sophisticated methods of business organisation and marketing which increase
the competitiveness of firms, as well as the clustering of industries and techno-
logical spillovers which increase the competitiveness of firms and industries and
the economy in general. Technological innovation, on the other hand, increases
an economy’s potential for increased GDP per capita and long term economic
growth. Such technological innovation is in terms of the development of new
high technology, advanced products and processes that are approaching the
frontiers of knowledge; such technological innovation occurs primarily through
purposive investment in R&D.
Innovation and technology is measured in terms of the degree of investment





The data were obtained from Eurostat (Eurostat (2013)). The data are
complete for the period 2000-2010 for all countries except for Greece, Malta
and Sweden detailed as follows: Greece: 2001, 2003-2007; Malta: 2002-2010;
Sweden: 2001, 2003-2010.3
Investment in R&D was selected as an indicator of innovation and technol-
2The Europe 2020 strategy has set a target of investment in R&D of 3% of GDP (Euro-
peanCommission (2010a)).
39/286 observations missing
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ogy as it is the indicator used in Europe 2020 to measure progress towards the
objective of technology and innovation.4
This indicator is a measure of purposive investment in R&D with the ob-
jective of technological innovation which increases an economy’s potential for
long term economic growth. The indicator is limited in that it measures only
the expenditures on investment in R&D, as opposed to the outcomes of invest-
ment in R&D. Certainly it is the technological innovation that results from
investment in R&D that is the driver of an economy’s potential for increased
GDP per capita and long term economic growth. However such data tend to
be scarce and incomplete.
Another limitation of investment in R&D as an indicator of technology and
innovation is that it includes only a narrow measure of innovation and technol-
ogy. The indicator excludes innovation and technology at a firm and industry
level which relates to the development of unique products and processes, and
sophisticated methods of business organisation and marketing with the objec-
tive of increasing competitiveness. The indicator also excludes the spillover
effects of technology and innovation as a result of the clustering of firms and
industries which increase the competitiveness of firms and industries within
clusters. Furthermore if such spillover effects diffuse widely and rapidly, they
can be an important source of innovation and technology for economy’s with
lower levels of investment in R&D, for whatever reason.Therefore investment
in R&D may not capture all of the elements of technology and innovation in
an economy.
Investment in R&D as a source of technology and innovation is relatively
more important and feasible in economies that are at an advanced stage of
development. Consequently, since advanced economies rely more on investment
in R&D as a source of technology and innovation than less advanced economies,
they will have higher levels of investment in R&D. For this reason, investment
in R&D is limited as a measure of innovation and technology in economies at a
lower stage of development. Furthermore it is limited as a source of innovation
and technology in economies that are at less advanced stage of development,
and therefore appears to be largely irrelevant to regional economic growth
and development as proposed by Europe 2020. The Eurostat database has
very limited data relating to four categories of innovation that may be more
4The Europe 2020 strategy has a target of investment in R&D of 3% of GDP (European-
Commission (2010a)).
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relevant to economies that are less than advanced, namely innovation in terms
of products and processes, and business organisation and marketing.5
Nonetheless, bearing in mind the abovementioned limitations, investment in
R&D is used as an indicator of innovation and technology to enable an analysis
of its relevance to Cohesion policy as proposed by Europe 2020. Although the
objectives of Europe 2020 capture other sources of innovation and technology,
investment in R&D is used as an indicator of innovation and technology due
to a lack of alternative relevant and complete data.
6.3.3 Human Capital: Education and Employment
Human capital is a variable of interest since it relates to the objectives of
Europe 2020.6
Secondly, based on the economic growth literature, human capital is consid-
ered to have a significant effect on GDP per capita. Human capital embodies
the knowledge, skills and experience of the workforce. Education increases
the stock of knowledge and skills of the labour force. The concept of edu-
cation is broader than only formal and higher education: vocational training
and on the job learning and training are as significant as formal and higher
education. Employment increases the stock of knowledge, skills and experience
of the labour force; ”learning by doing” plays a significant role in increasing
productivity and innovation and technology (Arrow (1962)). Additionally, the
stock of knowledge, skills and experience facilitates the creation and adoption of
new innovation and technology, including spillovers, within firms and industries
which further increase the productivity and competitiveness of firms and indus-
tries and the economy in general. Both of these effects increase the production
capacity and efficiency of an economy presently for a given set of factors of
production, technology, institutions and economic environment (Arrow (1962);
Lucas (1988)). Furthermore high levels of human capital are crucial for tech-
nological innovation which increases an economy’s potential for increased GDP
per capita and long term economic growth.
Human capital accumulation can significantly affect GDP per capita. Econ-
omies which have an ”early start” in an industry are able to accumulate higher
levels of human capital through ”learning by doing” and experience (Arrow
5The first year for which such indicators of innovation are available is 2010, and much of
the data are incomplete.
6The Europe 2020 strategy has set the targets of 40% tertiary education attainment rate,
10% early school leaving rate and 75% employment rate (EuropeanCommission (2010a)).
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(1962)). Furthermore, economies that specialise in industries or trade in goods
and services that require high levels of human capital have a higher potential
for the accumulation of human capital and will likely continue to accumulate
higher levels of human capital in the future (Lucas (1988)). Therefore the
effects of the accumulation of human capital are persistent and long term in
nature.
Human capital is measured in terms of education and employment.
Education is measured in terms of education attainment, being the average
years of secondary and tertiary education attained by the population over 25
years. The measure is lagged by ten years in order to take into account the
long term cumulative effects of an ”early start” in the accumulation of human
capital. A lag period of ten years is chosen as it corresponds to the year
1990 which is the first year of transition from planned to market economy for
EU12.7 In this way the effects on GDP per capita of an ”early start” in the
accumulation of human capital is taken into account.
The data were obtained from the Barro-Lee education attainment database
(Barro & Lee (2013)). The data are complete for the period 2000-2010 for all
countries.
The indicator for education is limited in that it measures only formal ed-
ucation attainment but does not take into account education attained during
vocational training and on the job learning and training which contribute sig-
nificantly to human capital accumulation.
Employment is measured in terms of employments rates, being the percent-
age of the population aged 15-64 that is employed.
The data were obtained from the Eurostat database (Eurostat (2013)). The
data are complete for the period 2000-2010 for all countries.
The indicator for employment is limited in that it measures only the extent
of employment in an economy but does not take into account the level of
knowledge, skills and experience accumulated in the labour force.
6.3.4 Control Variables
The vector Z contains observed control variables, derived from the neoclassical
growth model, which vary over time, namely trade integration, population
growth rate and savings rate.
7except for Cyprus and Malta
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T rade integration represents the extent of EU economic integration and ac-
cess to the Single Market.
Trade integration8 is measured in terms of the degree of trade integration









The measure was calculated using data obtained from the Eurostat database
(Eurostat (2013)). The data are complete for the period 2000-2010 for all coun-
tries except for Bulgaria, Finland, Ireland, Romania and Slovenia detailed as
follows: Bulgaria: 2006-2010; Finland: 2009-2010; Ireland: 2002-2010; Roma-
nia: 2007-2010; Slovenia: 2002-2010.9
T he population growth rate is measured in terms of the annual population
change rate resulting from both natural change, that is births and deaths, and
net migration. The data were obtained from the Eurostat database (Eurostat
(2013)). The data are complete for the period 2000-2010 for all countries.
T he savings rate is measured in terms of the investment share of real GDP
per capita (PPP indexed to 2005 international dollar). The data were obtained
from the Penn World Table v7.1 (Heston et al. (2012)). The data are complete
for the period 2000-2010 for all countries.
6.4 Results and Comparison of Estimators
6.4.1 Estimation Results
The results of the fixed effects and first difference estimations are presented
in columns A FE and A FD respectively in Figure 6.1. Heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation consistent (clustered) standard errors were used as the
idiosyncratic error term was found to be serially correlated in the fixed effects
estimation; these results are presented in column A FEr.10 The first difference
8This measure of trade integration is based on an ECB working paper relating to EU
trade integration (Mongelli et al. (2005)
926/286 observations missing
10Serial correlation was tested in STATA using a test statistic for panel data derived by
Wooldridge (2002) (Wooldridge (2002), p282; Drukker (2003))
6. Policy Focus for Reducing Disparities in GDP per capita across the EU 62
Figure 6.1: Regression Estimation: 2000-2010
estimation using robust standard errors is presented for comparative purposes
in column A FDr.
In the fixed effects estimation the use of clustered standard errors results
in the coefficient on investment in R&D not being statistically significant. The
coefficients on education attainment and the employment rate are statistically
significant in both estimations and show the expected positive sign. Education
attainment has a more significant effect on GDP per capita than the employ-
ment rate. The results of A FEr indicate that for a given country, as education
attainment increases across time by one year, GDP per capita tends to in-
crease by 8.0% ceteris paribus.11 Similarly, as the employment rate increases
across time by one percent, GDP per capita tends to increase by 2.2% ceteris
paribus. These estimates appear to be high, especially in respect of education
attainment.
In the first difference estimation the coefficients are smaller in magnitude
than those in the fixed effects estimation. The coefficient on investment in R&D
is also not statistically significant. The coefficients on education attainment
and the employment rate are statistically significant and show the expected
positive sign. As with the fixed effects estimation, education attainment has
11For the purposes of interpreting the estimation, the coefficients are expressed in terms
of GDP per capita as opposed to the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, the basis of
measurement for the dependent variable.
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a more significant effect on GDP per capita than the employment rate; 3.7%
and 1.4% respectively.
Thus the estimations present results that are similar in terms of the signif-
icance of the variables of interest and their relative magnitudes, although the
estimate for education attainment in the fixed effects estimation is relatively
high. The effect of investment in R&D on GDP per capita, while controlling
for time constant country-specific characteristics, is not statistically significant.
This result is in line with expectations that the relative importance of the ele-
ments of the economic set and technological innovation depend on the stage of
development.
6.4.2 Comparison of estimators: Consistency and Efficiency
The fixed effects and first difference estimators are based on two assump-
tions which determine their consistency and efficiency respectively (Wooldridge
(2010)). The first assumption relates to consistency and is the same for both
the fixed effects and the first difference estimators. The assumption is that of
strict endogeneity; that is, the independent variables are not correlated with
the idiosyncratic errors.12
The second assumption relates to efficiency, specifically the homoskedastic-
ity and serial correlation of the idiosyncratic errors (Wooldridge (2010)). The
fixed effects estimator is based on the assumption that the idiosyncratic er-
rors are not serially correlated, whereas the first difference estimator is based
on the assumption that the idiosyncratic errors follow a random walk, which
has substantial serial dependence (Wooldridge (2010)). When the assumption
that the idiosyncratic errors are not serially correlated holds, the fixed effects
estimator is more efficient than the first difference estimator; conversely the
first difference estimator is more efficient when the idiosyncratic errors follow
a random walk.
Accordingly, if the assumption of strict exogeneity holds, the choice in es-
timator depends on the idiosyncratic errors; although often the truth is some-
where between (Wooldridge (2010)). Serial correlation is tested in STATA
using a test statistic for panel data derived by Wooldridge (2002) (Wooldridge
(2002), p282; Drukker (2003)). The fixed effects estimator exhibits serial corre-
12The assumption of strict endogeneity for the fixed effects and first difference estimators
allows the independent variables to be arbitrarily correlated with the constant error.
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lation. Indeed the truth appears to be somewhere between, and thus the fixed
effects and first difference estimators are interpreted in conjunction.
6.5 Conclusions
The model presented above aims to determine those factors, in terms of Co-
hesion policy, most associated with high levels of GDP per capita in order to
provide a basis for informing the key policy focus areas of Cohesion policy for
the reduction of disparities in GDP per capita across member states. The vari-
ables of interest are innovation and technology and human capital, measured
in terms of education attainment and employment rate.
The conclusion based on the results of the fixed effects and first difference
estimations is that, while controlling for time constant country specific charac-
teristics, education attainment and employment rate are more significant than
investment in R&D in their effects on GDP per capita and, by implication,
in their contribution to the reduction of disparities in GDP per capita across
member states.
The indicators are limited in some ways. Education attainment does not
include vocational education and on-the-job education and training; the in-
clusion of such education will surely increase the effect of education on GDP
per capita. The employment rate does not include the skill level of the labour
force; a higher skill level of the labour force will surely have a greater effect on
GDP per capita. Most importantly, investment in R&D does not include inno-
vation and technology apart from purposive investment in R&D, and further it
does not include the diffusion of innovation and technology; these elements will
surely increase the effect of innovation and technology on GDP per capita and,
even more so, these elements are likely to be more relevant to lagging member
states which are at a less advanced stage of development.
This leads to the conclusion that investment in R&D is less relevant than
investment in human capital in terms of Cohesion policy for the reduction of
disparities in GDP per capita across member states. However, this is not to
say that investment in R&D is not relevant. On the contrary, investment in
R&D is relevant to advanced member states and crucial to the EU in terms
of global competitiveness and long term economic growth. In terms of EU
competitiveness, investment in R&D should be concentrated where it is most
efficient and productive and where it provides the highest return. To the ex-
tent that advanced member states and the EU benefit from the concentration
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of investment in R&D as a consequence, these benefits should be distributed
through the EU in terms of technology diffusion, or in terms of the distribution
of economic activity, employment or economic benefits.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
I t has long been recognised that technological innovation is the engine of long
term economic growth.
In the present context of the EU’s low economic growth and lagging global
competitiveness in terms of innovation and technology, technological innovation
is crucial for the EU’s global competitiveness and long term economic growth.
While such a strategy for the EU’s global competitiveness and long term
economic growth is important, it is important also that the EU promotes the
competitiveness and long term economic growth of each of its member states at
the same time. Firstly, the competitiveness of each member state can only add
to the EU’s global competitiveness. Secondly, the long term economic growth
of each member state and the reduction in disparities among member states in
terms of development and competitiveness is crucial in order to maintain the
economic feasibility of and political support for the EU.
Indeed, the recent and ongoing Euro sovereign debt crisis has seen the emer-
gence of significant and widening disparities among member states, most notice-
ably in terms of economic growth, unemployment—particularly with respect
to youth unemployment—and fiscal imbalances—particularly with respect to
government debt. Such disparities have led to economic and political instability
across the EU, and to questions as to the feasibility of the EU and the Single
Market.
Thus, Cohesion policy has as its objective the promotion of the development
and competitiveness of lagging member states and the reduction of disparities
among member states. More recently, within the context of Europe 2020,
Cohesion policy is identified as one of the key delivery mechanisms of the
Europe 2020 strategy, the key objective of which is technological innovation—
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the engine of long term economic growth—through the promotion of investment
in R&D and investment in human capital.
W ith the aim of identifying the key policy focus areas for Cohesion policy,
in relation to the objectives of Europe 2020, this thesis set out firstly, to assess
whether convergence in the EU is taking place and whether disparities among
member states are reducing and secondly, to assess the objectives of Europe
2020 in terms of the objectives of Cohesion policy, specifically the relative im-
portance of investment in R&D and investment in human capital in promoting
the development and competitiveness of lagging member states and in reducing
the disparities among member states.
Convergence in the EU is taking place in terms of both absolute beta con-
vergence and sigma convergence. The measures for both absolute beta con-
vergence and sigma convergence show that convergence was relatively high for
the period 2000-2010. In terms of sigma convergence there is an indication of
a slight increase in disparities in GDP per capita across member states after
2008, likely a result of the global financial crisis and Euro sovereign debt crisis.
The extent of divergence as a result of the crises remains to be seen as the
consequences of the crises continue to be played out.
The objectives of Europe 2020 appear to be not fully compatible with the
objectives of Cohesion policy in terms of promoting the development and com-
petitiveness of lagging member states and in reducing the disparities among
member states.
Specifically, the Europe 2020 objective of investment in R&D is not fully
compatible with the objectives of Cohesion policy. Investment in R&D tends
to favour concentration of R&D activity which increases its efficiency and pro-
ductivity. Furthermore R&D activity tends to concentrate in economies which
are developed and competitive; further increasing their competitiveness. Thus
while investment in R&D is crucial in promoting the EU’s global competitive-
ness and long term economic growth, it is likely that, without intervention, it
may further exacerbate disparities among member states in terms of competi-
tiveness and economic growth.
Secondly, the relative importance of investment in R&D in competitiveness
and economic growth depends crucially on an economy’s stage of development;
R&D is crucial for competitiveness and economic growth in advanced economies
but plays less of a role in economies that are less advanced. The various fac-
tors which affect competitiveness and economic growth, including investment in
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R&D, are interdependent and mutually reinforcing on economic growth; there-
fore the effects of investment in R&D on competitiveness and economic growth
in an economy which is less than advanced may be limited by other economic
factors.
Thirdly, investment in R&D is driven by the incentive to gain market power
and to earn profits. The allocation of Cohesion policy funds by the public sec-
tor will likely lack such incentive. Consequently investment in R&D may be
directed towards basic research by universities and public research institutes
over applied research by firms and industry which is less conducive to techno-
logical innovation, and especially more so if the link between universities and
public research institutes, and firms and industry is not strong. Furthermore
investment in R&D may be less efficient and productive in terms of technolog-
ical innovation and economic growth if it is not driven by the incentive to gain
market power and to earn profits.
On the other hand, the Europe 2020 objective of investment in human
capital is highly compatible with the objectives of Cohesion policy. Human
capital increases economic growth through increases in the productivity of an
economy and through increases in the capacity of an economy for the creation
of knowledge and innovation and the absorption of technology, even though
the economy may be less than advanced. Investment in human capital relates
to investment in both education and employment. Investment in education
incorporates formal and higher education as well as vocational training and
on-the-job training. Investment in employment includes job creation, with a
particular focus on high-skilled job creation which increases the potential for
human capital accumulation.
Secondly, the relative importance of investment in human capital in com-
petitiveness and economic growth is high for advanced and less advanced econ-
omies alike. Advanced economies benefit from human capital in respect of
increased capacity for technological innovation, whereas both advanced and
less advanced economies benefit from human capital in respect of increased
productivity and increased capacity for the creation of knowledge and inno-
vation and the absorption of technology. Furthermore although the various
factors which affect competitiveness and economic growth are interdependent
and mutually reinforcing on economic growth, human capital is acknowledged
as having a particularly significant effect on both other economic factors which
affect competitiveness and economic growth as well as on competitiveness and
economic growth itself.
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Thirdly, investment in human capital increases an economy’s potential for
competitiveness and long term economic growth. Investment in human capi-
tal presently increases human capital accumulation and consequently increases
the stock of human capital in the future, thereby increasing the potential for
technological innovation in advanced and less advanced economies alike.
Lastly, and crucially, investment in human capital must be accompanied
by increased and purposive diffusion of technology within the EU which serves
firstly, to increase technological innovation—the key determinant of long term
economic growth—of the EU as a whole by increasing the stock and availabil-
ity of knowledge and technology within the EU and secondly, to accelerate
the development and competitiveness of lagging member states. While lagging
member states may not benefit from investment in R&D directly, they may
surely benefit from the technological innovation that results elsewhere in the
EU as well as from the economic benefits deriving from technological innova-
tion enabled by the Single Market. After all, the Single Market in which all
member states participate plays a significant role in increasing the EU’s ca-
pacity for technological innovation. Furthermore the concentration of activity
related to technological innovation in economies where it is most efficient and
productive results in the highest return for the EU as a whole. Since techno-
logical innovation which benefits the EU as a whole is enabled by the Single
Market in which all member states participate, the economic benefits deriv-
ing from such technological innovation should be distributed within the EU,
through either purposive diffusion of technology, in terms of the distribution
of economic activity and employment based on the use of that technological
innovation, for example through FDI, or through the distribution of economic
benefits derived from that technological innovation through the EU budget in
terms of Cohesion policy. Importantly such measures for the purposive diffu-
sion of technology should increase employment and the rate of human capital
accumulation in competitive and lagging member states alike. Bearing in mind
the need to promote the EU’s global competitiveness, it is important to balance
the incentives for technological innovation and the distribution of the economic
benefits derived from technological innovation which is enabled by the Single
Market.
Thus with the approach toward the new Cohesion policy programming pe-
riod for 2014-2020, which continues to focus on the objectives of Europe 2020,
and in the context of the current economic environment in the EU and glob-
ally, it is recommended that the key policy focus areas for Cohesion policy, in
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relation to the objectives of Europe 2020, be investment in human capital in
terms of both education and employment accompanied by increased and pur-
posive diffusion of technology, and the benefits derived therefrom, within the
EU. Investment in education and employment should focus specifically on the
development and acquisition of high skills, encompassing vocational training
and on-the-job training, and the potential for human capital accumulation.
Diffusion of technological innovation may take the form of collaboration, FDI
or the implementation of higher technology (intra-)industry and production in
member states that are less advanced. Purposive diffusion of technology, and
the benefits derived therefrom, may occur through the distribution of economic
activity and employment or through the distribution through the EU budget
in terms of Cohesion policy. Importantly such measures for the purposive dif-
fusion of technology should increase employment and the rate of human capital
accumulation.
T his thesis contributes to current research in that the convergence analysis
and empirical model are performed using the most recent available data to 2010
for the twenty seven EU member states, which allows the analysis to take into
account the effects of the 2004 and 2007 EU accessions.
The analysis which forms the basis of the recommendations for the key pol-
icy focus areas for Cohesion policy is novel in that is considers the interrelation-
ship between the objectives of Cohesion policy and Europe 2020 in conjunction
with the interrelationship between investment in R&D and investment in hu-
man capital, and their relative importance in promoting competitiveness and
reducing disparities in GDP per capita across member states. In addition, the
analysis emphasises the significance of an economy’s stage of development in
determining the relative importance of investment in R&D and investment in
human capital.
Furthermore the recognition of the role of purposive diffusion of technol-
ogy is novel. Purposive diffusion of technology may play a significant role in
promoting both EU global competitiveness and long term economic growth,
as well as promoting the development and competitiveness of lagging member
states, through specifically employment and human capital accumulation. Pos-
sibilities for promoting such purposive diffusion of technology would need to be
further explored.
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F urther research may expand on the empirical model in order to take into
account the effects of time constant country specific characteristics. It is recog-
nised in the literature that factors such as institutional quality and environment
and geographical region play a role in determining competitiveness and long
term economic growth. Such factors may be relevant in reducing disparities in
GDP per capita across member states.
Secondly further research may focus on possibilities for promoting purposive
diffusion of technology in terms of Cohesion policy in order to promote the
development and competitiveness of lagging member states and to reduce the
disparities among member states, while at the same time promoting EU global
competitiveness and long term economic growth. Such possibilities would need
to balance the incentives for technological innovation and the distribution of the
benefits deriving from technological innovation enabled by the Single Market.
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Appendix A
GDP per capita in the EU
The figures below present the distribution of GDP per capita in the EU across
the twenty seven EU member states and across time. Luxembourg is identi-
fied as an outlier, therefore figures excluding Luxembourg are also presented
alongside for comparative purposes.
A. GDP per capita in the EU II
A.1 GDP per capita in the EU across member
states in 2010
Figure A.1: GDP per capita in the EU across member states in 2010
Figure A.2: GDP per capita in the EU across member states in 2010
excluding Luxembourg
A. GDP per capita in the EU III
A.2 Changes in the distribution of GDP per capita
in the EU over time
Figure A.3: Changes in the distribution of GDP per capita in the EU
over time
Figure A.4: Changes in the distribution of GDP per capita in the EU
over time excluding Luxembourg
